In 2017, “The Big Three” institutional investors launched campaigns to increase gender diversity on corporate boards. We estimate that their campaigns led American corporations to add at least 2.5 times as many female directors in 2019 as they had in 2016. Firms increased diversity by identifying candidates beyond managers’ existing networks and by placing less emphasis on candidates’ executive experience. Firms also promoted more female directors to key board positions, indicating firms’ responses went beyond tokenism. Our results highlight index investors’ ability to effectuate broad-based governance changes and the impact of investor buy-in in increasing corporate-leadership diversity.

We examine the effect of ex ante litigation risk on the price and non-price terms of loan contracts. Since expected litigation is endogenous, we focus on federal circuit court judge ideology to generate plausibly exogenous variation in the outcome of a class action lawsuit. We find that loans issued by firms headquartered in circuits with a higher likelihood of drawing a liberal panel of judges in a class action lawsuit have higher loan spreads, shorter maturity, and a larger number of and more restrictive covenants. To strengthen our claim that judge ideology affects loan contracting through its effect on the outcome of a class action lawsuit, we show that the influence of judge ideology on price and nonprice terms of loans is strongly influenced by factors that influence the probability of a class action lawsuit. Overall, our results bolster the case that litigation risk has a causal effect on debt contracting.

The increasing average distance between small businesses and their lenders has been used to argue that technological changes have allowed banks to lend at longer distances. Generally, studies assume that distance changes are uniform across loans and lenders. Our paper shows that, while average distance has increased substantially over the past two decades, banks themselves have not materially increased their lending distances. Instead, longer average distance was caused by a small number of banks that specialize in originating very small loans nationwide quadrupling their share of lending. Outside of these very small loans, small businesses remain dependent on local banks.

We study public versus private provision of health care for veterans aged 65 and older who may receive care provided by the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and in private hospitals financed by Medicare. Utilizing the ambulance design of Doyle et al. (2015), we find that the VA reduces 28-day mortality by 46 percent (4.5 percentage points) and that these survival gains are persistent. The VA also reduces 28-day spending by 21 percent and delivers strikingly different reported services relative to private hospitals. We find suggestive evidence of complementarities between continuity of care, health IT, and integrated care.

ABSTRACT We examine whether the complexity of mandatory accounting disclosures prompts managers to voluntarily disclose adjusted measures of actual earnings performance, and whether this practice reflects attempts to obfuscate or mitigate the informational opacity accounting complexity creates for investors. Using the metadata in XBRL filings, we construct measures of accounting complexity that map directly to the mandated standards applied in financial statement filings. We find a positive and economically significant association between accounting complexity and managers’ propensity to disclose non-GAAP earnings information. This relation is robust and incremental to common measures of business and linguistic complexity, and the transitory nature of firms’ economic activities. We also find that the quality and informativeness of adjusted earnings information increases with accounting complexity, consistent with motives to better inform investors when accounting disclosures are complex. Overall, our results suggest that managers use non-GAAP earnings disclosure to mitigate the adverse informational effects of accounting complexity. Data Availability: All data are available from sources identified in the paper. JEL Classifications: M41; M43.

ABSTRACT This study examines managers’ strategic use of concurrent disclosures around the announcement of negative material events. We predict and find that managers disclosing negative 8-K news are more likely to issue a concurrent press release about an unrelated event relative to a press release providing additional context for the 8-K–triggering event in order to increase investor information processing costs. This strategy appears distinct from the bundling of news to deter litigation. We find that managers more commonly issue concurrent unrelated press releases when they have stronger incentives to impede the pricing of negative information and that doing so is associated with a reduction in the speed with which prices reflect the news. Our findings shed light on a previously unexplored tool managers use to exploit investors’ processing capacity constraints to “hide” negative news. JEL Classifications: G12; G14; M41; M48.

ABSTRACT We propose a pairwise measure of financial statement benchmarking (FSB) that captures the degree of overlap in the financial statement line items reported by two firms. We validate FSB by showing its association with actual peer choices of analysts and corporate boards. We then test the practical implications of FSB in the context of strategic peer selection by these parties. We find that analyst (board) chosen peers with low pairwise FSB are more likely to be strategic selections and that the set of peers assembled by an analyst (board) collectively having low FSB is associated with more optimistic earnings forecasts (higher CEO overpay). We also demonstrate alternative applications of FSB by aggregating the pairwise measure at the firm level and decomposing it into finer financial statement-specific components. Our evidence suggests that FSB can be a relevant tool for those using benchmarking applications, including practitioners and academics. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper. JEL Classifications: M41.

ABSTRACT We document that central banks are discontinuously more likely to report slightly positive profits than slightly negative profits, especially when political pressure is greater, the public is more receptive to extreme political views, and central bank governors are eligible for reappointment. The propensity to report small profits over small losses is correlated with higher inflation and lower interest rates. We conclude that there are agency problems at central banks, which give rise to discontinuous profit incentives that correlate with central banks’ policy choices and outcomes. These findings inform the debate about the political economy of central banking and central bank design.

ABSTRACT After a natural experiment is first used, other researchers often reuse the setting, examining different outcome variables. We use simulations based on real data to illustrate the multiple hypothesis testing problem that arises when researchers reuse natural experiments. We then provide guidance for future inference based on popular empirical settings including difference‐in‐differences, instrumental variables, and regression discontinuity designs. When we apply our guidance to two extensively studied natural experiments, business combination laws and the Regulation SHO pilot, we find that many results that were statistically significant using single hypothesis testing do not survive corrections for multiple hypothesis testing.