This study examines whether and how legislative gridlock in Congress affects legislative uncertainty. Results show that legislative gridlock increases cross-sectional dispersion in returns on individual stocks and portfolios over short windows around roll-call votes on Congressional bills. The effect of gridlock is beyond political polarization, Presidential ideology, unified versus divided governments, economic recession, policy uncertainty (Baker et al., 2016), and macroeconomic uncertainty (Jurado et al., 2015). Greater legislative uncertainty is associated with higher bond yield and lower likelihood of seasoned equity offerings and analyst recommendations. The effect of gridlock depends on industry and firm characteristics, as well as political polarization and Presidential ideology. Overall, legislative gridlock increases legislative uncertainty as reflected in cross-sectional dispersion in stock returns.

Journal Article Education and Economic Growth Get access Sheng Cheng Hu Sheng Cheng Hu Purdue University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 43, Issue 3, October 1976, Pages 509–518, https://doi.org/10.2307/2297229 Published: 01 October 1976 Article history Received: 01 January 1974 Accepted: 01 December 1975 Published: 01 October 1976

Ex ante estimates of the volatility premium embedded in VIX futures, known as the VIX premium, fall or stay flat when ex ante measures of risk rise. This is not an artifact of mismeasurement: (i) ex ante premiums reliably predict ex post returns to VIX futures with a coefficient near one, and (ii) falling ex ante premiums predict increasing ex post market and investment risk, creating profitable trading opportunities. Falling hedging demand helps explain this behavior, as premiums and trader exposures tend to fall together when risk rises. These facts provide a puzzle for theories of why investors hedge volatility. Received January 13, 2017; editorial decision April 26, 2018 by Editor Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh.

We propose a Bayesian-averaging portfolio choice strategy with excellent out-of-sample performance. Every period a new model is born that assumes means and covariances are constant over time. Each period we estimate model parameters, update model probabilities, and compute robust portfolio choices by taking into account model uncertainty, parameter uncertainty, and non-stationarity. The portfolio choices achieve higher out-of-sample Sharpe ratios and certainty equivalents than rolling window schemes, the 1/N approach, and other leading strategies do on a majority of 24 datasets.

The Russell 1000 and 2000 stock indexes comprise the first 1000 and next 2000 largest firms ranked by market capitalization. Small changes in the capitalizations of firms ranked near 1000 move them between these indexes. Because the indexes are value-weighted, more money tracks the largest stocks in the Russell 2000 than the smallest in the Russell 1000. Using this discontinuity, we find that additions to the Russell 2000 result in price increases and deletions result in price declines. We then identify time trends in indexing effects and the types of funds that provide liquidity to indexers.

[In certain circumstances, insider trades such as private transactions between executives and their firms could be disclosed after the end of the firm's fiscal year, on a Form-5 filing. We find that insider sales disclosed in such a delayed manner for large firms are predictive of negative future returns (-6 to -8 percent), as well as lower future annual earnings relative to analyst forecasts. These results stand in contrast to existing findings on the uninformativeness of quickly disclosed open-market insider sales. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act curtailed the use of Form 5 under the presumption that managers used this vehicle opportunistically. Our systematic evidence supports this presumption.]

This study uses the introduction of second-generation antitakeover legislation as a natural experimental setting to infer the value that managers place on the control rights conferred by stock ownership. We conjecture that managers will reduce their stockholdings in the post-legislation period because they can ensure their prior level of control while holding fewer risky shares. Using a variety of specifications, we find robust evidence consistent with this "revealed preference" hypothesis. Further demonstrating the key role played by control considerations in managers' stockholding decisions, the reductions in ownership are concentrated in management teams with higher levels of initial ownership and in firms without poison pills.