This paper investigates oil depletion and trade when monopolistic oil producers also exercise monopoly power in the capital market. A two-period model views collusively organized oil producers with an initial trade surplus and a subsequent deficit. When monopoly power in the capital market is applied to the disadvantage of borrowers, less oil is initially made available to oil importers than if the interest rate had been competitively determined. This depletion bias, however, is reversed if, because of incentives for capital accumulation, it is to the advantage of the oil producers to subsidize lending to the oil importers. In either case the bias in oil depletion due to monopolistic recycling of oil revenue is greater, the more vulnerable are oil importers' incomes to a curtailment of oil supplies.

[Little is known about the speed and accuracy of aggregate taxpayer response to an income tax law change. Using a multiple time series model, it was found that individuals and corporations quickly and relatively accurately adjust their income tax prepayments in response to a tax increase.]

This article discusses the accounting implications of a new type of financial security introduced on the European bond market. The security, known as a deferred-payment note, allows the investor to acquire a note by paying a portion of the issue price at the time of issuance. The remaining amount is required to be paid in a second installment due some months later. Alternative accounting treatments are presented. These treatments are evaluated in light of the FASB's conceptual framework pronouncements. The paper concludes that the FASB's current position fails to provide appropriate guidelines which the profession can use to resolve this new financial reporting issue.