Numerous studies have established that part of the very substantial male-female earnings gap is explained by differences in the amount of human capital workers have accumulated. (See, for example, Jacob Mincer and Haim Ofek, 1983.) Institutional factors have also been found to play a role in determining wages (David Gordon et al., 1982). Occupation further helped to explain the remaining gap, but several researchers have shown that introducing dimensions of work authority by taking into account the individual's position in the work hierarchy explains more of the variation in earnings than does occupation (Martha Hill, 1980). Last, two recent studies (Ferber and Spaeth, 1984; Spaeth, 1985) also included control over monetary resources. This variable added substantially to the explanatory power of earnings regressions, even after human capital variables, institutional factors, and several other measures of work authority had been entered. Like the other studies, Ferber and Spaeth also found that reward structures for men and women are quite different, suggesting the possible existence of discrimination. The question whether women may also be at a disadvantage in achieving control over monetary resources was not investigated. When Hill examined the process of achievement of work authority, she found substantial differences between male and female workers. In this paper we examine whether the same is true for attaining financial control. I. Data and Analysis

Paul Davis and Gustav Papanek (1984) ranked major economics departments by citations; however, their approach was not novel. Dennis Gerretz and Richard McKenzie (1978) initiated the use of citations to rank economics departments. Though they ranked only southern economics departments for the years 1976 and 1977, GerritzMcKenzie used both total citations and mean citations as ranking criteria. As Davis-Papanek and Gerritz-McKenzie have shown, the citation-ranking approach eliminates many of the problems of ranking departments using journal articles and offers a qualitative as well as quantitative measure of faculty productivity. Both studies, however, ranked only Ph.D. granting institutions and ignored those economics departments which offer a master's degree as the highest degree awarded. Although many Ph.D.granting departments have master's programs, these institutions tend to concentrate on training future academicians and to treat the master's degree as a consolation prize for unsuccessful Ph.D. students. While non-Ph.D.-granting institutions may have different incentives, teaching loads, computer and library support, and quality and extent of graduate research assistantships, we use a citations-based criterion to demonstrate that these institutions should not be neglected as sources of economic research.' Column (1) of Table 1 shows the ranking of economics departments offering the master's degree as the highest degree based upon the average number of citations for the years 1977-1981 for department faculties denoted in the 1982 catalogs of their respective institutions (ties are ranked equally). Our procedure differs from Davis-Papanek in that they averaged citations from 1978 and 1981 only. Given the wide range of faculty size, column (2) denotes the mean citation per faculty member per year. As Davis-Papanek found for Ph.D.-granting institutions, the rankings do change significantly. Four of the top ten departments are replaced by smaller departments and there is considerable shuffling among the remaining top ten departments. Since Davis-Papanek included faculty members citing their own work, this may bias one of the major advantages of using citations instead of the number of major journal publications; that is, citations measure the quality of a person's research in stimulating further research by others. Column (3) ranks departments by citations per year adjusting for self-citations. In some cases this correction is important. For example, Auburn moves from 9th to 15th, Brigham Young from 5th to 13th, and West Texas State from 12th to 6th. In general, there is a high correlation between the two rankings (the Spearman rank correlation coefficient is .99). Another potential weakness of a citation index is the fact that one article cited ten times is weighted equally with ten articles cited once each. It would be an interesting exercise to examine how innovations in the literature (as measured by citations per article) compare between master's only institutions, and middleto lower-ranked Ph.D. programs. Because Davis-Papanek do not separate the number of articles cited from the number of citations, we are unable to make this comparison. For this reason, the number of articles is not reported in our tables. For master's only institutions, the * Blair and Wallace: Department of Economics, Clemson University, 222 Sirrin Hall, Clemson, SC 29631; Cottle: University of Mississippi. We thank an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions on a earlier draft. Any remaining errors are our own. 'Philip Graves et al. (1982) included master's only institutions in their publications-based rankings.

Reviews several books. "Secrets of the Tax Revolt," by James Ring Adams; "Financial Statement Analysis: Theory, Application, and Interpretation," 3rd ed., by Leopold A. Bernstein; "Perspectives in Auditing," 4th ed., by D.R. Carmichael and John J. Willingham; "Tax Shelter Alternatives: Measuring the Risks," by Michael N. Fitzerald.

This paper analyses data on union and employer rankings of different panels of arbitrators in an actual arbitration system. A random utility model of bargainer preferences is developed and estimated. The estimates indicate that unions and employers have similar preferences, in favor of lawyers, more experienced arbitrators, and arbitrators who seem to have previously favored their side. Alternative rankings models, which are estimated to test whether bargainers rank arbitrators strategically, reveal no evidence of strategic behavior.

Recent compositional changes in industrial and occupational structures have created technological displacement for many workers. Accompanying these institutional changes is increased foreign competition which has forced previously profitable firms to collapse. What happens to workers when competition and displacement create job loss? Many studies have found that with job termination, workers face long spells of unemployment and reentry into occupations with lower wages and fringe benefits; however, few studies have examined gender differences in the consequences of job termination. In fact, most research in this area has been case studies focusing solely on men. This study analyzes gender differences in employment and wages upon job termination. It answers the question, Do women fare better or worse than men upon job termination?

Publication of the December 1985 issue of the Journal of Finance completed the Journal's first 40 years of contributions to the profession. This study identifies and summarizes the contributing authors, where they earned their doctoral degrees, and their employers at the time of publication. The authors, degree-granting institutions, and employers appearing most frequently in the Journal are ordered for the entire 40-year period and for various subperiods. Where possible, the present findings are compared with those of previously published studies.

Publication of the December 1985 issue of the Journal of Finance completed the Journal's first 40 years of contributions to the profession. This study identifies and summarizes the contributing authors, where they earned their doctoral degrees, and their employers at the time of publication. The authors, degree‐granting institutions, and employers appearing most frequently in the Journal are ordered for the entire 40‐year period and for various subperiods. Where possible, the present findings are compared with those of previously published studies.