Defined benefit pension and health care plans are important for firm leverage around the world. While consolidating off-balance sheet post-retirement plans increases effective leverage by 32%, firms reduce their level of regular debt by only 22 cents for every dollar of projected benefit obligation, yielding overall 23% higher total leverage of plan sponsors compared with similar firms without post-retirement plans. The most important driver of substitution rates between regular debt and post-retirement obligations is rule of law, followed by labor market freedom and taxes. In contrast, pension guarantee funds and priority of unfunded pension obligations are less important for substitution rates.

This paper develops a real options model in which firms may use the timing of their initial public offerings (IPOs) to signal the quality of their investment prospects to outside investors. When adverse selection is more relevant (cold markets), firms with better investment prospects accelerate their IPO relative to their perfect information benchmark to reveal their type to outside investors. When adverse selection is less relevant (hot markets), all firms issue simultaneously, issuers are younger on average, and IPO timing is uninformative. An extension with multiple signals and the empirical evidence show that better ranked firms are younger, issue a lower fraction of shares, and underprice more during cold markets, and that issuers are younger on average during hot markets.

This paper analyzes the effect of uncertainty about the mean return on the risky asset on the portfolio decisions of an investor who has a long investment horizon. Building on the earlier work of Detemple (1986), Dothan and Feldman (1986), and Gennotte (1986), it is shown that the possibility of future learning about the mean return on the risky asset induces the investor to take a larger or smaller position in the risky asset than she would if there were no learning, the direction of the effect depending on whether the investor is more or less risk tolerant than the logarithmic investor whose portfolio decisions are unaffected by the possibility of future learning. Numerical calculations show that uncertainty about the mean return on the market portfolio has a significant effect on the portfolio decision of an investor with a 20 year horizon if her assessment of the market risk premium is based solely on the Ibbotson and Sinquefield (1995) data.

Evaluating capital‐investment decisions is an important function of managerial accountants. There is anecdotal evidence, however, that managers avoid making decisions or delay decisions, which is costly in terms of time, effort, and lost opportunities. Prior research has shown that choice avoidance among nonprofessionals making personal decisions is associated with having to choose between alternatives with very different features or that require trade‐offs of very important goals (choice difficulty). It is unclear, however, whether experienced managers, using the analytical decision tools at their disposal, respond in the same way as nonprofessionals when making accounting decisions. Hence, this study examines whether increased choice difficulty increases negative affect in the capital‐investment decision‐making process and, as a result, the tendency of managers to avoid choice even when analytical decision tools are used. In an experiment with 120 executives, participants facing more difficult decisions reported they felt more worried, nervous, uneasy, and anxious and had a greater desire to postpone making the decision than participants in a control group. Participants provided with a decision aid designed to help them focus their cognitive effort reported a lower desire to postpone making the decision than participants in the choice‐difficulty conditions without the decision aid. I conclude by discussing the result's implications for managers and accountants.

In this study, we appeal to insights and results from Davidson and Neu 1993 and McConomy 1998 to motivate empirical analyses designed to gain a better understanding of the relationship between auditor quality and forecast accuracy. We extend and refine Davidson and Neu's analysis of this relationship by introducing additional controls for business risk and by considering data from two distinct time periods: one in which the audit firm's responsibility respecting the earnings forecast was to provide review‐level assurance, and one in which its responsibility was to provide audit‐level assurance. Our sample data consist of Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) initial public offerings (IPOs). The earnings forecast we consider is the one‐year‐ahead management earnings forecast included in the IPO offering prospectus. The results suggest that after the additional controls for business risk are introduced, the relationship between forecast accuracy and auditor quality for the review‐level assurance period is no longer significant. The results also indicate that the shift in regimes alters the fundamental nature of the relationship. Using data from the audit‐level assurance regime, we find a negative and significant relationship between forecast accuracy and auditor quality (i.e., we find Big 6 auditors to be associated with smaller absolute forecast errors than non‐Big 6 auditors), and further, that the difference in the relationship between the two regimes is statistically significant.