Whether governments clash in trade disputes or negotiate over trade agreements, their actions in the international arena reflect political conditions back home. Previous studies of cooperative and noncooperative trade relations have focused on governments that are immune from political pressures and that act as benevolent servants of the public interest. Here we take a first step toward introducing domestic politics into the analysis of international economic relations. We study the interactions between national leaders who are concerned both with providing a high standard of living to the general electorate and collecting campaign contributions from special interest groups. The analysis reveals the determinants of the structure of protection in a noncooperative trade war and in a cooperative trade agreement.

Offshore dollar-denominated equity-linked issues were a more important source of funds for Japanese companies during the 1980s than domestic equity and straight debt issues combined. Using a sample of Japanese equity-linked offshore issues from 1977 to 1989, we find that the announcement of these issues is accompanied by a significant positive abnormal return. This contrasts with evidence that U.S. equity-linked issues have a significant negative stock price reaction. We provide an explanation for the difference in stock price reactions between U.S. and Japanese issues that is based on the greater influence on managers' security issue decisions of long-term investors and banks in Japan than in the U.S.

This paper provides a simple framework showing that the extent of competition in credit markets is important in determining the value of lending relationships. Creditors are more likely to finance credit-constrained firms when credit markets are concentrated because it is easier for these creditors to internalize the benefits of assisting the firms. The paper offers evidence from small business data in support of this hypothesis.

Leland E. Crabbe, Christopher M. Turner, Does the Liquidity of a Debt Issue Increase with Its Size? Evidence from the Corporate Bond and Medium-Term Note Markets, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 50, No. 5 (Dec., 1995), pp. 1719-1734

The dynamics of innovation in industry dominant designs and the survival of firms product innovation as a creative force innovation and industrial evolution innovation in non-assembled products differences in innovations for assembled and non-assembled products invasion of a stable business by radical innovation the creative power of technology in process innovation innovation as a game of chutes and ladders innovation and corporate renewal.

This article provides a new methodology for pricing and hedging derivative securities involving credit risk. Two types of credit risks are considered. The first is where the asset underlying the derivative security may default. The second is where the writer of the derivative security may default. The authors apply the foreign currency analogy of R. Jarrow and S. Turnbull (1991) to decompose the dollar payoff from a risky security into a certain payoff and a 'spot exchange rate.' Arbitrage-free valuation techniques are then employed. This methodology can be applied to corporate debt and over the counter derivatives, such as swaps and caps.

To investigate the liquidity of large issues, this study tests for yield differences between corporate bonds and medium-term notes. In the sample, medium-term notes have an average issue size of 4 million, compared with 265 million for bonds. Among medium-term notes that have the same issuance date, the same maturity date, and the same corporate issuer, the authors find no relation between size and yields. Moreover, bonds and medium-term notes have statistically equivalent yields. Thus, rather than suggesting that large issues have greater liquidity, these findings indicate that large and small securities issued by the same borrower are close substitutes.

To investigate the liquidity of large issues, this study tests for yield differences between corporate bonds and medium‐term notes (MTNs). In the sample, MTNs have an average issue size of $4 million, compared with $265 million for bonds. Among MTNs that have the same issuance date, the same maturity date, and the same corporate issuer, we find no relation between size and yields. Moreover, bonds and MTNs have statistically equivalent yields. Thus, rather than suggesting that large issues have greater liquidity, these findings indicate that large and small securities issued by the same borrower are close substitutes.

[This paper evaluates alternative accrual-based models for detecting earnings management. The evaluation compares the specification and power of commonly used test statistics across the measures of discretionary accruals generated by the models and provides the following major insights. First, all of the models appear well specified when applied to a random sample of firm-years. Second, the models all generate tests of low power for earnings management of economically plausible magnitudes (e.g., one to five percent of total assets). Third, all models reject the null hypothesis of no earnings management at rates exceeding the specified test-levels when applied to samples of firms with extreme financial performance. This result highlights the importance of controlling for financial performance when investigating earnings management stimuli that are correlated with financial performance. Finally, a modified version of the model developed by Jones (1991) exhibits the most power in detecting earnings management.]