Bilateral trade deficits are a perennial policy issue. Former Deputy Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Japan and China, Merit Janow (1994 p. 55), notes that during the first George Bush administration, “High deficits coupled with the continuing allegations from U.S. business interests about the closed nature of the Japanese market were resulting in serious domestic political pressures for improved access to the Japanese market.” Recently Robert C. Feenstra et al. (1998 p. 1) made similar comments vis-a-vis China: “Some analysts have interpreted the large U.S.–China bilateral trade deficit as prima facie evidence of unacceptably high levels of protectionism in China, and have advocated stringent entry conditions for China’s admission into WTO.” Given the policy salience of bilateral trade deficits, it is peculiar that no one has ever examined them empirically for a broad set of countries. One reason for the scant study is that economists are naturally (and sensibly) loath to accept the terms of the policy debate, which considers bilateral trade deficits ipso facto harmful. A second reason is that economists believe there may be very natural explanations for bilateral imbalances. One such explanation finds its origins in macroeconomic identities that equate current-account deficits to an excess of investment over saving. From this, it may be argued that bilateral imbalances will arise naturally in trade between countries in aggregate surplus and those in aggregate deficit. Indeed, this is the principal explanation that the profession has given policymakers, and it forms the foundation of many U.S. bilateral trade initiatives such as the Structural Impediments Initiative and the Framework talks. Janow (1994 p. 55) observes that “there was (and is) little disagreement among economists that the causes of large aggregate and bilateral deficits are largely attributable to macroeconomic factors” [italics added]. A second account may rely on what may be termed “triangular trade,” in which cross-country differences in the patterns of demand and supply mean that a country will run bilateral deficits with those countries that are unusually important suppliers of the goods for which the deficit country happens to be an unusually strong demander. In this paper, we use the canonical “gravity model” of bilateral trade to form predictions about bilateral trade balances. We develop two key variants of the model, in which bilateral trade imbalances arise due to aggregate macroeconomic imbalances or due to “triangular trade,” and we implement these empirically for a broad set of countries. Our results paint a dismal picture. The central explanations that economists provide to explain bilateral balances perform miserably. There are two key failures. First, actual bilateral trade imbalances are much larger than those predicted; there is a “mystery of excess trade balances.” Second, even after we allow for both macroeconomic imbalances and idiosyncrasies in the structure and levels of demand and production, the models perform poorly in explaining bilateral trade balances. These failures of economists’ standard explanations of bilateral trade imbalances require that we move beyond the simple gravity framework to consider alternative explanations: homogeneous goods, highly specialized intermediates, and the role of policy.

We investigate the effect of an increase in the individual (shareholder-level) income tax rate on share values. We regress cumulative daily abnormal stock returns surrounding the passage of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 on firm dividend yield, tax status of the investor as represented by level of institutional ownership, the interaction of these two variables, and control variables. Consistent with our expectations, we find that (1) the higher the firm's dividend yield, the more negative the firm's stock price reaction to the increase in the individual income tax rate (i.e., the dividend tax rate) enacted in the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, and (2) institutional holdings mitigate this negative reaction. Our results suggest that both the dividend policy of the firm and the tax status of the marginal investor influence the extent to which dividend taxes are reflected in share values. Our evidence is consistent with the traditional view that firm dividend policy influences the extent to which tax rate changes affect share values.

We investigate how unique features of charities affect the manner in which they compensate their executives. We find that changes in compensation are significantly positively associated with changes in spending on programs that advance organization objectives, whether changes in program spending are attributable to changes in revenue raised or to changes in the relative costs of administering the charity. The results suggest that accounting performance measures can play a role in nonprofit organizations whose objectives are typically subjective and nonfinancial, and thus, whose progress toward objectives is difficult to quantify.

There are two tax incentives for corporations to hedge: to increase debt capacity and interest tax deductions, and to reduce expected tax liability if the tax function is convex. We test whether these incentives affect the extent of corporate hedging with derivatives. Using an explicit measure of tax function convexity, we find no evidence that firms hedge in response to tax convexity. Our analysis does, however, indicate that firms hedge to increase debt capacity, with increased tax benefits averaging 1.1 percent of firm value. Our results also indicate that firms hedge because of expected financial distress costs and firm size.

We examine whether the price response to bad and good earnings shocks changes as the relative level of the market changes. The study is based on a complete sample of annual earnings announcements during the period 1988 to 1998. The relative level of the market is based on the difference between the current market P/E and the average market P/E over the prior 12 months. We find that the stock price response to negative earnings surprises increases as the relative level of the market rises. Furthermore, the difference between bad news and good news earnings response coefficients rises with the market.

This paper offers a new approach to the study of economic problems usually modeled as games of incomplete information with discontinuous payoffs. Typically, the discontinuities arise from indeterminacies (ties) in the underlying problem. The point of view taken here is that the tie-breaking rules that resolve these indeterminacies should be viewed as part of the solution rather than part of the description of the model. A solution is therefore a tie-breaking rule together with strategies satisfying the usual best-response criterion. When information is incomplete, solutions need not exist; that is, there may be no tie-breaking rule that is compatible with the existence of strategy profiles satisfying the usual best-response criteria. It is shown that the introduction of incentive compatible communication (cheap talk) restores existence. Copyright The Econometric Society 2002.

This study compares samples of publicly and privately held bank holding companies to examine whether the high frequency of small earnings increases relative to small earnings decreases reported by public firms is attributable to earnings management. We expect public banks' shareholders to be more likely than private banks' shareholders to rely on simple earnings-based heuristics in evaluating firm performance, so we expect public banks to have more incentives to report steadily increasing earnings. Consistent with this expectation, we find that relative to private banks, public banks: (1) report fewer small earnings declines, (2) are more likely to use the loan loss provision and security gain realizations to eliminate small earnings decreases, and (3) report longer strings of consecutive earnings increases. These results suggest that the asymmetric pattern of more small earnings increases than decreases, first documented by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), is attributable to earnings management and is not simply a reflection of the underlying distribution of earnings changes.

We consider the distribution of economic activity within a country in light of three leading theories—increasing returns, random growth, and locational fundamentals. To do so, we examine the distribution of regional population in Japan from the Stone Age to the modern era. We also consider the Allied bombing of Japanese cities in WWII as a shock to relative city sizes. Our results support a hybrid theory in which locational fundamentals establish the spatial pattern of relative regional densities, but increasing returns help to determine the degree of spatial differentiation. Long-run city size is robust even to large temporary shocks.

We analyze several hundred firms that expand via acquisition and/or increase their number of business segments. The combined market reaction to acquisition announcements is positive but acquiring firm excess values decline after the diversifying event. Much of the excess value reduction occurs because our sample firms acquire already discounted business units, and not because diversifying destroys value. This implies that the standard assumption that conglomerate divisions can be benchmarked to typical stand‐alone firms should be carefully reconsidered. We also show that excess value does not decline when firms increase their number of business segments because of pure reporting changes.

We analyze a sample of 72 IPO firms that went public between 1992 and 1996 for which we have detailed proprietary information about the amount and cost of D&O liability insurance. If managers of IPO firms are exploiting superior inside information, we hypothesize that the amount of insurance coverage chosen will be related to the post‐offering performance of the issuing firm's shares. Consistent with the hypothesis, we find a significant negative relation between the three‐year post‐IPO stock price performance and the insurance coverage purchased in conjunction with the IPO. One plausible interpretation is that, like insider securities transactions, D&O insurance decisions reveal opportunistic behavior by managers. This provides some motivation to argue that disclosure of the details of D&O insurance decisions, as is required in some other countries, is valuable.