We combine matched Danish worker-firm-trade data with detailed individual-worker training data. We find: 1) workers displaced from offshoring firms take up more vocational-training and have a harder time getting re-attached to the labor-force than other displaced workers, and they also exhibit higher vocational-training take-up rates 2 years before layoffs; 2) the staying workers with offshoring firms take up more vocational-training than those with non-offshoring firms; and 3) the post-secondary-training take-up rates for displaced workers are no different than for the general population.

Using a large dataset on web browsing and purchasing behavior we test to what extent consumers are searching in accordance to various search models. We find that the benchmark model of sequential search with a known price distribution can be rejected based on recall patterns found in the data as well as the absence of dependence of search decisions on prices. Our findings suggest fixed sample size search provides a more accurate description of search behavior. We then utilize the fixed sample size search model to estimate demand elasticities of online bookstores in an environment where store preferences are heterogeneous.

Investor protection is associated with greater investment sensitivity to q and lower investment sensitivity to cash flow. Finance plays a role in causing these effects; in countries with strong investor protection, external finance increases more strongly with q , and declines more strongly with cash flow. We further find that q and cash flow sensitivities are associated with ex post investment efficiency; investment predicts growth and profits more strongly in countries with greater q sensitivities and lower cash flow sensitivities. The paper's findings are broadly consistent with investor protection promoting accurate share prices, reducing financial constraints, and encouraging efficient investment.

This study explains the challenges associated with the Heckman (1979) procedure to control for selection bias, assesses the quality of its application in accounting research, and offers guidance for better implementation of selection models. A survey of 75 recent accounting articles in leading journals reveals that many researchers implement the technique in a mechanical way with relatively little appreciation of important econometric issues and problems surrounding its use. Using empirical examples motivated by prior research, we illustrate that selection models are fragile and can yield quite literally any possible outcome in response to fairly minor changes in model specification. We conclude with guidance on how researchers can better implement selection models that will provide more convincing evidence on potential selection bias, including the need to justify model specifications and careful sensitivity analyses with respect to robustness and multicollinearity. Data Availability: Data used are available from public sources identified in the study.

We develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a binary issue, individuals may buy and sell their votes with each other. We define the concept of ex ante vote-trading equilibrium and show by construction that an equilibrium exists. The equilibrium we characterize always results in dictatorship if there is any trade, and the market for votes generates welfare losses, relative to simple majority voting, if the committee is large enough or the distribution of values is not very skewed. We test the theoretical implications in the laboratory using a continuous open-book multiunit double auction.

This study isolates the causal effects of financial literacy and schooling on wealth accumulation using a new household dataset and an instrumental variables (IV) approach. Financial literacy and schooling attainment are both strongly positively associated with wealth outcomes in linear regression models, whereas the IV estimates reveal even more potent effects of financial literacy. They also indicate that the schooling effect only becomes positive when interacted with financial literacy. Estimated impacts are substantial enough to imply that investments in financial literacy could have large wealth payoffs.

Compensation committees face special difficulties when setting pay in the last years of a CEO's tenure. For example, incentives to manipulate earnings for the purpose of enhancing earnings-based compensation are greater in CEOs' terminal years. We predict that compensation committees are aware of these incentives and adjust the relative weights placed on earnings components in the cash compensation function to mitigate the problem. Consistent with our prediction, we find that in CEOs' terminal years, positive changes in discretionary accruals receive significantly less weight than other income components in determining cash compensation. This provides new evidence that not all gains flow through to compensation. We also find that in non-terminal years, managers' compensation is partially shielded from the negative effects of selling, general, and administrative expenditures (SG&A), but this effect reverses in the terminal period, consistent with the compensation committee discouraging investment in legacy assets by outgoing CEOs. Overall, our findings suggest that compensation committees treat components of earnings differently when setting pay in the terminal period.

We develop a quality competition model to understand how price controls affect market outcomes in buyer-seller markets with discrete goods of varying quality. While competitive equilibria do not necessarily exist in such markets when price controls are imposed, we show that stable outcomes do exist and characterize the set of stable outcomes in the presence of price restrictions. In particular, we show that price controls induce non-price competition: price floors induce the trade of inefficiently high quality goods, while price ceilings induce the trade of inefficiently low quality goods.

Can heuristic information processing affect important product markets? Analyzing over 22 million wholesale used-car transactions, we find evidence of left-digit bias in the processing of odometer values, whereby individuals focus on the number's leftmost digits. The bias leads to discontinuous drops in sale prices at 10,000-mile odometer thresholds, along with smaller drops at 1,000-mile thresholds. These findings reveal that information-processing heuristics matter even in markets with large stakes and easily observed information. We model left-digit bias in an inattention framework and structurally estimate the inattention parameter. Empirical patterns suggest the results are driven by final customers rather than professional agents.

We measure job-filling rates and recruiting intensity per vacancy at the national and industry levels from January 2001 to September 2011 using data from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey. Industry-level movements in these variables are at odds with implications of the standard matching function in labor search theory but consistent with a generalized function that incorporates an important role for recruiting intensity. Construction makes up less than five percent of employment but accounts for more than 40 percent of the large swings in the job-filling rate during and after the Great Recession.