We analyze the role of “directors from related industries” (DRIs) on a firm's board. DRIs are officers and/or directors of companies in the upstream/downstream industries of the firm. DRIs are more likely when the information gap vis-à-vis related industries is more severe or the firm has greater market power. DRIs have a significant impact on firm value/performance, especially when information problems are worse. Furthermore, DRIs help firms handle industry shocks and shorten their cash conversion cycles. Overall, our evidence suggests that firms choose DRIs when the adverse effects due to conflicts of interest are dominated by the benefits due to DRIs' information and expertise.

Are overconfident executives more likely to be promoted to CEOs? Using an option-based overconfidence measure, we show that firms with overconfident executives tend to hire internally. Further, when firms hire internally, they are more likely to pick a more confident candidate. The results suggest that governance and board inattention can play a role, with overconfident executives being more likely to become CEOs in firms with entrenched and busy boards, suggesting that such boards might confuse luck-with-skill following the confident executives’ tendencies towards greater risk-taking.

We predict that firms’ attempts to reduce litigation risk can inadvertently worsen financial report readability by increasing reports’ size, complexity, and altering their linguistic characteristics. We find that litigation risk reduces report readability. Readability worsens after firms experience a securities class action. This persists for several years after lawsuit resolution. To alleviate endogeneity concerns, we show that the litigation experience of a firm's managers and directors at other firms impacts readability. We also find that firms adjust readability around litigation flashpoints. Using an SEC rule change as an exogenous shock, we show that adjustments to readability can moderate firm litigation risk.