Many CEOs engage in activism by publicly expressing their views on social, environmental, and political issues, while other CEOs refrain from doing so—a behavior we term CEO inactivism. We use two experiments to examine how CEO (in)activism impacts investor decisions. Our results are consistent with our theoretical predictions. When a CEO expresses an activist position that is consistent versus inconsistent with investors' views, investors invest more in the CEO's firm because they perceive the CEO more positively. We also find that CEO inactivism can lead to investment decisions that are as favorable as when the CEO expresses a position consistent with investors' views; our process evidence suggests that this may occur because CEO inactivism increases the likelihood that investors believe the CEO shares their position on a social issue. Finally, we do not find evidence that investor decisions are influenced by whether CEO (in)activism is in response to an external prompt. This study contributes to the emerging literature on CEO activism, a unique form of voluntary disclosure, by providing evidence about how CEO (in)activism influences investors. We also contribute to the literature examining the impact of social media disclosure on investor decisions. Finally, our findings have practical implications for CEOs, who increasingly face external pressures to engage in activism.

This paper extends prior work on the links between political patronage and capital structure in developing economies. Three proxies of political patronage are developed and applied to a group of Malaysian firms over a 10-year period. We find a positive and significant link between leverage and each of the three measures of political patronage. We also find evidence of an indirect link between political patronage and capital structure through firm size and profitability.

A ‘tax-loss selling’ hypothesis has frequently been advanced to explain the ‘January effect’ reported in this issue by Keim. This paper concludes that U.S. tax laws do not unambiguously predict such an effect. Since Australia has similar tax laws but a July–June tax year, the hypothesis predicts a small-firm July premium. Australian returns show pronounced December–January and July–August seasonals, and a premium for the smallest-firm decile of about four percent per month across all months. This contrasts with the U.S. data in which the small-firm premium is concentrated in January. We conclude that the relation between the U.S. tax year and the January seasonal may be more correlation than causation.

Paper presented at the September l980 meetings of the American Economic and American Finance Associations in Denver, Colorado.

"Paper presented at the September l980 meetings of the American Economic and American Finance Associations in Denver, Colorado."

Richard A. Cohn, Donald R. Lessard, Recent Research on Indexation and the Housing Market, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 31, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the American Finance Association Dallas, Texas December 28-30, 1975 (May, 1976), pp. 403-413