The Arrow-Debreu analysis of decentralized resource allocation in a Walrasian economy assumes constant or decreasing returns to scale in production. Recently, several authors have extended this analysis to economies with a public monopoly, that is, a firm with increasing returns to scale. In this literature, the salient feature is the characterization of increasing returns to scale technologies as nonconvex production sets, so that under this definition both single and multiproduct firms may exhibit increasing returns. Here, our intended model is an economy with a competitive sector consisting of households and firms with convex technologies, and a public sector consisting of firms with nonconvex technologies. A special case is a single multiproduct firm which produces products for regulated markets (with a nonconvex technology) and produces products for unregulated markets (with a convex technology), for example, ATT firms with constant or decreasing returns are maximizing profits; the public monopoly is pricing at marginal cost, where potential losses are covered by the lump sum taxes; and all markets clear. An average cost-pricing equilibrium is a family of consumption plans, production plans and prices such that households are maximizing utility subject to their budget constraint; firms with constant or decreasing returns are maximizing profits; the public monopoly is pricing at average cost, that is, breaking even or making zero profits; and all markets clear. Unfortunately, all of the extant proofs of existence of a MCP or an ACP equilibrium are somewhat technical in nature and lack the transparency of counting equations and unknowns which many economists accept as an intuitive, if not formally correct, proof of existence. In view of this, one of the purposes of this paper is to demonstrate the existence of a MCP and an A CP equilibrium in a simple economy with increasing returns, where the equilibrium notions are characterized by systems of behavioral equations and market-clearing conditions. We give both an intuitive proof of existence by counting equations and unknowns, and a formal argument that these systems of equations have a solution by use of a simple fixed-point argument. In addition, we review several of the standard partial equilibrium prescriptions for the regulation of a public monopoly and show that in a general equilibrium model they can be interpreted as MCP or A CP equilibria.

PART ONE: Introduction to Bank Management: The Changing Nature of Bank Management Understanding a Bank's Financial Statements A Model for Measuring Returns and Risks in Banking Evaluation of a Bank's Performance PART TWO: Basic Asset, Liability and Capital Decisions: Measuring and Providing Reserves and Liquidity Managing the Security Portfolio Trends in Acquisition and Cost of Bank Funds Capital Planning, Adequacy and Generation Capital Acquisition and Management PART THREE: Managing the Loan Portfolio: The Bank Credit Organization Lending Principles and the Business Borrower Commercial Lending Consumer Lending Special Markets for Bank Loans Part Four: Integrative Bank Financial Decisions: Interest Margin Sensitivity and Management Advanced Alternatives for Measuring and Managing Interest Rate Risk Innovations in Products and Pricing Bank Mergers and Acquisitions International Banking Long Range Planning for Future Performance.

This paper investigates the long-run recovery experience of US banks that received capital infusions under the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), a part of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Based on a dynamic recovery model, our results show that recovering CPP banks tended to be in better financial condition than other CPP banks. Long-run event study analyses of common stock prices reveal that, in the quarter after repayment of TARP funds, CPP banks experienced economically large and significant buy-and-hold wealth gains of 14%, equivalent to approximately $329billion. We conclude that TARP was successful in fostering bank financial and stock price recovery.

We assess the total factor productivity of 35,752 manufacturing establishments before and after management buyouts (MBOs). MBO plants are less productive than comparable plants before the transfer of ownership. They experience a substantial increase in productivity after a buyout, which appears to be due to measures undertaken by new owners to reduce the labor intensity of production, via outsourcing of intermediate goods and materials. These findings, which are pervasive across industries, imply that MBOs reduce agency costs and enhance economic efficiency. Our evidence is consistent with Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002), who suggest that ownership changes shift resources to more efficient uses and to better managers.