Evidence from both psychology and economics indicates that individuals give statements that appear to overestimate their ability compared to that of others. We test three theories that predict such relative overconfidence. The first theory argues that overconfidence can be generated by Bayesian updating from a common prior and truthful statements if individuals do not know their true type. The second theory suggests that self-image concerns asymmetrically affect the choice to receive new information about one's abilities, and this asymmetry can produce overconfidence. The third theory is that overconfidence is induced by the desire to send positive signals to others about one's own skill; this suggests either a bias in judgement, strategic lying, or both. We formulate this theory precisely. Using a large data set of relative ability judgements about two cognitive tests, we reject the restrictions imposed by the Bayesian model and also reject a key prediction of the self-image models that individuals with optimistic beliefs will be less likely to search for further information about their skill because this information might shatter their self-image. We provide evidence that personality traits strongly affect relative ability judgements in a pattern that is consistent with the third theory of social signalling. Our results together suggest that overconfidence in statements is more likely to be induced by social concerns than by either of the other two factors.

CEOs with large networks earn more than those with small networks. An additional connection to an executive or director outside the firm increases compensation by about $17,000 on average, more so for "important" members, such as CEOs of big firms. Pay-for-connectivity is unrelated to several measures of corporate governance, evidence in favor of an efficient contracting explanation for CEO pay.

Sacrifice is widely believed to enhance cooperation in churches, communes, gangs, clans, military units, and many other groups. We find that sacrifice can also work in the lab, apart from special ideologies, identities, or interactions. Our subjects play a modified VCM game—one in which they can voluntarily join groups that provide reduced rates of return on private investment. This leads to both endogenous sorting (because free-riders tend to reject the reduced-rate option) and substitution (because reduced private productivity favours increased club involvement). Seemingly unproductive costs thus serve to screen out free-riders, attract conditional cooperators, boost club production, and increase member welfare. The sacrifice mechanism is simple and particularly useful where monitoring difficulties impede punishment, exclusion, fees, and other more standard solutions.

Agglomeration is a location pattern frequently observed in service industries such as hotels. This paper empirically examines whether agglomeration facilitates tacit collusion in the lodging industry using a quarterly data set of hotels in Texas. We jointly model a price and occupancy rate equation under a switching regression model to identify a collusive and noncollusive regime. The estimation results indicate that clustered hotels have a higher probability of being in the potential collusive regime than isolated properties in the same town. The identification of a collusive regime is also consistent with other factors considered to affect the sustainability of tacit collusion.

Why do workers earn so much more in the United States than in India? This study compares the earnings of workers in the two countries in a unique setting. The product is perfectly tradable (software), technology differences are nil (they are members of the same work team), and the workers are identical in expectation (those who enter the United States are chosen by natural randomization). The results suggest that output tradability, technology, and human capital together explain much less than half of the earnings gap. Location itself may have large effects on individual workers' wages and productivity, for reasons poorly understood.

This study evaluates the link between CEO governance heterogeneity, power structure of the firm, and product market competition on various facets of post-IPO cash policy. Our results suggest that post-IPO cash holdings as well as marginal value of cash reserves are higher under a founder CEO governance regime relative to non-founder CEOs. Concentrating board power in the hands of founder CEOs however, reduces their ability to maintain higher post-IPO cash reserves. Our results also suggest that product market competition influences both the level and marginal value of cash reserves in the hands of founder CEOs. Further, we find that stronger internal governance reduces the tendency of IPO firms to deploy excess cash reserves to fund internal investments in excess of industry rivals. Finally, our results suggest that excess cash reserves in competitive industry environments lead to superior post-IPO operating performance.

Why is the equity premium so high, and why are stocks so volatile? Why are stock returns in excess of government bill rates predictable? This paper proposes an answer to these questions based on a time‐varying probability of a consumption disaster. In the model, aggregate consumption follows a normal distribution with low volatility most of the time, but with some probability of a consumption realization far out in the left tail. The possibility of this poor outcome substantially increases the equity premium, while time‐variation in the probability of this outcome drives high stock market volatility and excess return predictability.

This paper documents “runs” on asset‐backed commercial paper (ABCP) programs in 2007. We find that one‐third of programs experienced a run within weeks of the onset of the ABCP crisis and that runs, as well as yields and maturities for new issues, were related to program‐level and macro‐financial risks. These findings are consistent with the asymmetric information framework used to explain banking panics, have implications for commercial paper investors’ degree of risk intolerance, and inform empirical predictions of recent papers on dynamic coordination failures.

Differences in real interest rates across developed economies are puzzlingly large and persistent. I propose a simple explanation: bonds issued in the currencies of larger economies are expensive because they insure against shocks that affect a larger fraction of the world economy. I show that, indeed, differences in the size of economies explain a large fraction of the cross‐sectional variation in currency returns. The data also support additional implications of the model: the introduction of a currency union lowers interest rates in participating countries, and stocks in the nontraded sector of larger economies pay lower expected returns.

This paper examines three distinct hypothesis testing problems that arise in the context of identification of some nonparametric models with endogeneity. The first hypothesis testing problem we study concerns testing necessary conditions for identification in some nonparametric models with endogeneity involving mean independence restrictions. These conditions are typically referred to as completeness conditions. The second and third hypothesis testing problems we examine concern testing for identification directly in some nonparametric models with endogeneity involving quantile independence restrictions. For each of these hypothesis testing problems, we provide conditions under which any test will have power no greater than size against any alternative. In this sense, we conclude that no nontrivial tests for these hypothesis testing problems exist.