This paper shows that borrowers’ ethical behavior leads lending banks to loosen financing conditions when setting loan rates. We advance the banking literature by stressing that the previous financing loosening is enhanced when there is similarity of lenders and borrowers along their ethical domain given that such similarity brings about familiarity and trust in non-opportunistic behavior between them, thereby contributing to lower information frictions. Unique data composed of 12,545 syndicated loan facilities from 19 countries for the period 2003–2007 indicate a 24.8% reduction in the mean spread associated with an increase of one standard deviation in the degree of borrowers’ ethical behavior from its mean value. Such reduction is enhanced to 37.6% when lenders also behave in an ethical way. Results withstand a battery of robustness tests including the use of alternative databases that capture the effect of the 2008 financial crisis, financing alternatives such as equity financing as well as nonparametric estimations.

We test the biasedness of unsolicited ratings relative to solicited ratings using the ex post firm performance measured by the long-run stock performance of firms following rating announcements and changes. We find that the announcements of new unsolicited ratings are followed by negative long-run stock performance, while those of new solicited ratings are followed by insignificant long-run stock performance. These results are inconsistent with the conservatism hypothesis that suggests that unsolicited ratings are downward biased. We further demonstrate that firms with solicited upgraded (downgraded) ratings experience subsequent positive (negative) abnormal stock performance, while those with unsolicited rating changes have zero abnormal stock performance. The differential stock performance following rating changes between solicited and unsolicited ratings reflect the differential information carried by each type of rating rather than the biasedness in ratings. Specifically, while solicited ratings are based on both public and private information, unsolicited ratings are mainly based on public information. Overall, we find no evidence for a downward bias in unsolicited ratings.

Peer Reviewed

Internet-based educational resources are proliferating rapidly. One concern associated with these (potentially transformative) technological changes is that they will be disequalizing—as many technologies of the last several decades have been—creating superstar teachers and a winner-take-all education system. These important concerns notwithstanding, we contend that a major impact of web-based educational technologies will be the democratization of education: educational resources will be more equally distributed, and lower-skilled teachers will benefit. At the root of our results is the observation that skilled lecturers can only exploit their comparative advantage if other teachers complement those lectures with face-to-face instruction. This complementarity will increase the quantity and quality of face-to-face teaching services, potentially increasing the marginal product and wages of lower-skill teachers.

In this paper, we describe a series of laboratory experiments that implement specific examples of a general network structure. Specifically, actions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements, and participants have either complete or incomplete information about the structure of a random network. Since economic environments typically have a considerable degree of complementarity or substitutability, this framework applies to a wide variety of settings. We examine behavior and equilibrium selection. The degree of equilibrium play is striking, in particular with incomplete information. Behavior closely resembles the theoretical equilibrium whenever this is unique; when there are multiple equilibria, general features of networks, such as connectivity, clustering, and the degree of the players, help to predict informed behavior in the lab. People appear to be strongly attracted to maximizing aggregate payoffs (social efficiency), but there are forces that moderate this attraction: (1) people seem content with (in the aggregate) capturing only the lion's share of the efficient profits in exchange for reduced exposure to loss, and (2) uncertainty about the network structure makes it considerably more difficult to coordinate on a demanding, but efficient, equilibrium that is typically implemented with complete information.

The expectations management literature has so far focused on firms meeting the analyst consensus forecast—the expectations of analysts as a group—at earnings announcements. In this study we argue that investors may use individual analyst forecasts as additional benchmarks in evaluating reported earnings because the consensus forecast underutilizes private information contained in individual analyst forecasts. We predict that measures reflecting such private information have incremental explanatory power over the consensus forecast for the market's reaction to earnings news. We find results consistent with this prediction by examining two measures: (1) the percentage of individual forecasts met and (2) meeting the key analyst forecast. We extend the literature by documenting the role of individual analyst forecasts in investors' evaluations of reported earnings. JEL Classifications: G10; G11; G17; G14; G24. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the paper.

What determines securitization levels, and should they be regulated? To address these questions we develop a model where originators can exert unobservable effort to increase expected asset quality, subsequently having private information regarding quality when selling ABS to rational investors. Absent regulation, originators may signal positive information via junior retentions or commonly adopt low retentions if funding value and price informativeness are high. Effort incentives are below first‐best absent regulation. Optimal regulation promoting originator effort entails a menu of junior retentions or one junior retention with size decreasing in price informativeness. Zero retentions and opacity are optimal among regulations inducing zero effort.

We document that successive cohorts of college and post-college degree graduates experienced an increase in the probability of obtaining cognitive jobs both at the start of their careers and with time in the labor market in the 1990s. However, this pattern reversed for cohorts entering after 2000; profiles of the proportion of a cohort in cognitive occupations since school completion fall and become flatter with successive cohorts. Since cohort-wage profiles display a similar pattern, these findings appear to fit with a strong increase in demand for cognitive tasks in the 1990s followed by a decline in the 2000s.

This study examines the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on IPO underpricing and the relative amount of IPO capital raised in foreign markets. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find a decrease in IPO underpricing and an increase in the relative proceeds from foreign markets following mandatory IFRS adoption. We also find that mandatory IFRS adoption has a greater impact on IPO underpricing and relative foreign proceeds for firms in countries with a larger number of accounting changes, and this relation is more pronounced among firms in countries with stronger implementation credibility. In addition, we find that the decrease in underpricing associated with mandatory IFRS adoption holds for both domestic IPOs and global IPOs, and this effect is more pronounced for global IPOs than for domestic IPOs. Overall, our study contributes to the literature by documenting the impact of changes in financial accounting standards on IPO underpricing and capital market globalization.

There is a large body of accounting research literature examining the use of analytical procedures by auditors and proposing either new types of analytical procedures or more effective ways of implementing existing procedures. In this paper, we demonstrate—using procurement data from a leading global bank—the value added in an audit setting of a new type of analytical procedure: process mining of event logs. In particular, using process mining, we are able to identify numerous transactions that we consider to be audit-relevant information, including payments made without approval, violations of segregation of duty controls, and violations of company-specific internal procedures. Furthermore, these identified anomalies were not detected by the bank's internal auditors when they conducted their examination of that same data using conventional audit procedures, thus establishing the benefits of using process mining to complement existing audit methods. Process mining is a very different approach to evidence collection and analysis as it does not focus on the value of transactions and its aggregations, but on the transactional processes themselves. In addition to demonstrating the benefits of process mining in an audit context, this paper also discusses the contributions that process mining can make both to accounting research and auditing practice.