Abstract This study investigates the association between going concern opinions and the market's reaction to bankruptcy filings. The results of prior studies indicate that going concern opinions are useful in predicting bankruptcy and provide some explanatory power in predicting bankruptcy resolution. As such, going concern opinions may reduce the surprise associated with bankruptcy. Our results are consistent with this assertion. Firms receiving going concern opinions experience less negative excess returns in the period surrounding bankruptcy filings than those receiving unqualified opinions. These results hold after controlling for the probability of bankruptcy, the market's reaction to news announcements occurring prior to bankruptcy, and changes in stock price prior to the issuance of the auditor's report. Overall, our results are consistent with going concern opinions having information value.

We test the hypothesis that when their compensation is linked to relative performance, managers of investment portfolios likely to end up as will manipulate fund risk differently than those managing portfolios likely to be An empirical investigation of the performance of 334 growth-oriented mutual funds during 1976 to 1991 demonstrates that mid-year losers tend to increase fund volatility in the latter part of an annual assessment period to a greater extent than mid-year winners. Further, we show that this effect became stronger as industry growth and investor awareness of fund performance increased over time.

ABSTRACT We test the hypothesis that when their compensation is linked to relative performance, managers of investment portfolios likely to end up as “losers” will manipulate fund risk differently than those managing portfolios likely to be “winners.” An empirical investigation of the performance of 334 growth‐oriented mutual funds during 1976 to 1991 demonstrates that mid‐year losers tend to increase fund volatility in the latter part of an annual assessment period to a greater extent than mid‐year winners. Furthermore, we show that this effect became stronger as industry growth and investor awareness of fund performance increased over time.

A cash-in-advance model of a monetary economy is used to derive a money-based CAPM (M-CAPM), which allows us to implement tests of asset pricing restrictions without consumption data. A test as in Fama and MacBeth of the model suggests that the money betas have some explanatory power for the cross-sectional variation of expected returns; however, the model is rejected using conditional information. Consistent with our predictions, estimates of the curvature parameter are lower than those of the consumption CAPM (C-CAPM) and pricing errors of the M-CAPM tend to be smaller than those of the C-CAPM.