We report evidence consistent with institutional investors using industry-level information that they obtain from their investments in venture capital (VC) funds to earn excess returns in publicly traded stocks. We use court rulings regarding the Freedom of Information Act as an exogenous shock affecting the information flow between VC funds and institutional investors to show that the excess returns are explained by information received via this channel. Thus, institutional investors serve as conduits of information from private to public markets. In the process, institutional investors earn higher returns from their VC investments than implied by the cash flows received therefrom.

We use increases and decreases in the ranking scores of Fortune's Most Admired Companies to test the proposition that media shocks can increase (decrease) the value of a manager's reputational capital and, thus, enhance (diminish) his power to extract corporate resources for private benefit at the expense of shareholders. Consistent with the proposition increases (decreases) in scores are associated with stock price decreases (increases). And, CEOs whose firms experience increases (reductions) in scores experience increases (reductions) in compensation and in job tenure, and their firms undertake more (fewer) acquisitions and the acquisitions are less (more) value increasing.

We analyze the likelihood of government bailouts of 450 politically connected firms from 35 countries during 1997–2002. Politically connected firms are significantly more likely to be bailed out than similar nonconnected firms. Additionally, politically connected firms are disproportionately more likely to be bailed out when the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank provides financial assistance to the firm's home government. Further, among bailed‐out firms, those that are politically connected exhibit significantly worse financial performance than their nonconnected peers at the time of and following the bailout. This evidence suggests that, at least in some countries, political connections influence the allocation of capital through the mechanism of financial assistance when connected companies confront economic distress.

Using end‐of‐month bid‐ask spreads for 540 NYSE stocks over the period 1982–1987, we document a seasonal pattern in which both relative and absolute spreads decline from the end of December to the end of the following January. Cross‐sectional regressions do not, however, provide evidence of a significant correlation between changes in spreads at the turn of the year and January stock returns. Either there is no cause and effect relation between the coincidental seasonals in bid‐ask spreads and January returns for NYSE stocks or the data are too “noisy” to reveal any relation.

Using end-of-month bid-ask spreads for 540 NYSE stocks over the period 1982–1987, we document a seasonal pattern in which both relative and absolute spreads decline from the end of December to the end of the following January. Cross-sectional regressions do not, however, provide evidence of a significant correlation between changes in spreads at the turn of the year and January stock returns. Either there is no cause and effect relation between the coincidental seasonals in bid-ask spreads and January returns for NYSE stocks or the data are too “noisy” to reveal any relation.

Stock price increases associated with addition to the S&P 500 Index have been interpreted as evidence that demand curves for stocks slope downward. A key premise underlying this interpretation is that Index inclusion provides no new information about companies' future prospects. We examine this premise by analyzing analysts' earnings per share (eps) forecasts around Index inclusion and by comparing postinclusion realized earnings to preinclusion forecasts. Relative to benchmark companies, companies newly added to the Index experience significant increases in eps forecasts and significant improvements in realized earnings. These results indicate that S&P Index inclusion is not an information‐free event.