By buying convertibles and shorting the underlying stock, hedge funds distribute equity exposure to well-diversified shareholders. We find that firms with characteristics that make seasoned equity offerings expensive are more likely to issue convertibles to hedge funds. We conclude that hedge funds provide opportunities for firms to issue convertible securities at a lower cost than seasoned equity by serving as relatively low-cost distributors of equity exposure. A higher fraction of a convertible is privately placed with hedge funds when institutional ownership, stock liquidity, issue size, concurrent stock repurchases, and limitations on callability suggest that shorting costs will be lower.

We explore the relation between family ownership and corporate investment policy. Our analysis centers on two incentives, risk aversion and extended investment horizons, which potentially influence the level and type of investments that family firms undertake. We find that family firms devote less capital to long-term investments than firms with diffuse ownership structures. When dividing long-term investment into its two components of R&D and capital expenditures, we note that family firms, relative to nonfamily firms, prefer investing in physical assets relative to riskier R&D projects. Additional tests indicate that family firms receive fewer patent citations per dollar of R&D investment relative to nonfamily firms. Overall, all empirical results indicate that family preferences for lower firm risk, across all family sub-types, affects corporate R&D spending and capital expenditures.

The financial crisis has refocused attention on money and credit fluctuations, financial crises, and policy responses. We study the behavior of money, credit, and macroeconomic indicators over the long run based on a new historical dataset for 14 countries over the years 1870–2008. Total credit has increased strongly relative to output and money in the second half of the twentieth century. Monetary policy responses to financial crises have also been more aggressive, but the output costs of crises have remained large. Credit growth is a powerful predictor of financial crises, suggesting that policymakers ignore credit at their peril. JEL: E32, E44, E52, G01, N10, N20

We propose a framework to create village economic and balance of payments accounts from a micro-level household survey. Using the Townsend Thai data, we create the accounts for villages in rural and semi-urban areas of Thailand. We then study these village economies as small open countries, exploring in particular the relationship between the real and financial variables. We examine cross-village risk-sharing and the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle. Our results suggest that within-village risk-sharing is better than across-village and, while there is smoothing in both, the mechanisms are different. We also find that, unlike countries, the cross-village capital markets are highly integrated.

We examine whether audit quality affects the trade-off between accrual-based and real earnings management. We hypothesize that firms motivated to manage earnings per share (EPS) to meet or beat consensus analysts' forecasts are more likely to engage in accretive stock repurchases (a form of real earnings management) when their ability to manage earnings through accruals is constrained by high audit quality. We find that firms with high audit quality are more likely to use accretive stock repurchases and less likely to use accrual-based earnings management to meet or beat consensus analysts' forecasts. Our results are robust to various controls for endogeneity concerns.

We exploit a unique data set to study individual characteristics of CEO candidates for companies involved in buyout and venture capital transactions and relate these characteristics to subsequent corporate performance. CEO candidates vary along two primary dimensions: one that captures general ability and another that contrasts communication and interpersonal skills with execution skills. We find that subsequent performance is positively related to general ability and execution skills. The findings expand our view of CEO characteristics and types relative to previous studies.

The ongoing global financial crisis has led to the largest increase in state intervention since the Great Depression. Direct government ownership in publicly-traded corporations has increased dramatically since 2008. How will this increase in public ownership affect the governance of these erstwhile private companies? We examine the impact of government ownership on corporate governance using a sample of firms from the European Union, a region that is relatively familiar with active government participation. Our main finding is that government ownership is associated with lower governance quality. We further show that while government intervention is negatively related to governance quality in civil law countries, it is positively related to governance quality in common law countries. Finally, we find that the preferential voting rights of golden shares are especially damaging to governance quality.

We examine the effect of home market short-sale constraints on securities that also trade in other countries that have more liberal short-sale rules. In particular, we focus on the case of ADRs traded in the US, as in some cases, the home markets of these ADRs prohibit short selling. We find that short sellers more heavily trade ADRs from countries where short selling is prohibited than from markets where short selling is allowed. Furthermore, we find that the greater levels of short selling in ADRs with binding home-market constraints is driven by stocks with greater dispersion of investors’ opinion, low fundamentals-to-price ratios, and recent price increases. Our results support the hypothesis that short sellers target ADRs with home market short-sale constraints because these ADRs are more often subject to temporary misvaluation.

U.S. stocks are more volatile than stocks of similar foreign firms. A firm's stock return volatility can be higher for reasons that contribute positively (good volatility) or negatively (bad volatility) to shareholder wealth and economic growth. We find that the volatility of U.S. firms is higher mostly because of good volatility. Specifically, stock volatility is higher in the United States because it increases with investor protection, stock market development, new patents, and firm‐level investment in R&D. Each of these factors is related to better growth opportunities for firms and better ability to take advantage of these opportunities.

This paper investigates the effect of financial deepening on the relationship between trade credit and cash holdings among Chinese listed firms. We first document an asymmetric effect of trade payables and receivables on cash holdings, in that firms hold an additional 0.71 of cash for every 1 of credit payable but use 1 of receivables as a substitute for only 0.15 of cash. We then find that firms in regions with higher levels of financial deepening hold less cash for payables while substituting more receivables for cash. A more highly developed financial sector helps firms to better use trade credit as a short-term financing instrument. Finally, we find that the ratio at which receivables are substituted for cash increased following the implementation of the new receivables pledge policy in 2007, which allowed firms to use receivables as security for loans. This policy event represents an exogenous shock that mitigates the endogeneity concern.