The authors report the results of voluntary contributions experiments where subjects are randomly assigned different rates of return from their private consumption. These random assignments are changed round to round, enabling the measurement of individual player contribution rates as a function of that player's investment cost. The authors directly test these response functions for the presence of warm-glow and/or altruism effects. They find significant evidence for heterogeneous warm-glow effects that are, on average, low in magnitude. The authors statistically reject the presence of an altruism effect.

Recent studies have documented that firms conducting seasoned equity offerings have inordinately low stock returns during the five years after the offering, following a sharp run-up in the year prior to the offering. This article documents that the operating performance of issuing firms shows substantial improvement prior to the offering, but then deteriorates. The multiples at the time of the offering, however, do not reflect an expectation of deteriorating performance. Issuing firms are disproportionately high-growth firms, but issuers have much lower subsequent stock returns than nonissuers with the same growth rate.

Recent studies have documented that firms conducting seasoned equity offerings have inordinately low stock returns during the five years after the offering, following a sharp run‐up in the year prior to the offering. This article documents that the operating performance of issuing firms shows substantial improvement prior to the offering, but then deteriorates. The multiples at the time of the offering, however, do not reflect an expectation of deteriorating performance. Issuing firms are disproportionately high‐growth firms, but issuers have much lower subsequent stock returns than nonissuers with the same growth rate.

Life-cycle models of labor supply predict a positive relationship between hours supplied and transitory changes in wages. We tested this prediction using three samples of wages and hours of New York City cabdrivers, whose wages are correlated within days but uncorrelated between days. Estimated wage elasticities are significantly negative in two out of three samples. Elasticities of inexperienced drivers average approximately −1 and are less than zero in all three samples (and significantly less than for experienced drivers in two of three samples). Our interpretation of these findings is that cabdrivers (at least inexperienced ones): (i) make labor supply decisions “one day at a time” instead of intertemporally substituting labor and leisure across multiple days, and (ii) set a loose daily income target and quit working once they reach that target.

The Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) model of factor service trade is a mainstay of international economics. Empirically, though, it is a flop. This warrants a new approach. We test the HOV model with international and Japanese regional data. The strict HOV model performs poorly because it cannot explain the international location of production. Restricting the sample to Japanese regions provides no help, inter alia giving rise to what Daniel Trefler calls the "mystery of the missing trade." However, when we relax the assumption of universal factor price equalization, results improve dramatically. In sum, the HOV model performs remarkably well.

Economic development is typically accompanied by migration from rural to urban employment. This migration is often associated with significant urban underemployment. Both factors are important in the development process. We consider a neoclassical growth model with rural‐urban migration and urban underemployment, which arises from an adverse selection problem in labor markets. We demonstrate that rural‐urban migration and underemployment can be a source of development traps and can give rise to a large set of periodic equilibria display long periods of uninterrupted growth, punctuated by brief but severe recessions.

Leading financial scholars present essays examining the performance of the basic financial functions underlying global financial systems: payments, lending and investing, pooling funds, allocating risk, providing information, and dealing with incentive issues - with particular emphasis on how their performance is changing and implications for the future.

We extend the standard procurement model to examine how an agent is optimally induced to acquire valuable planning information before he choose an unobservable level of cost‐reducing effort. Concerns about information acquisition cause important changes in standard incentive contracts. Reward structures with extreme financial payoffs arise, and super‐high‐powered contracts are coupled with contracts that entail pronounced cost sharing. However, if the principal can assign the planning and production tasks to two different agents, then all contracting distortions disappear and, except for forgone economies of scope, the principal achieves her most preferred outcome.

Exchange economies were created in which individuals faced losses. If people are risk seeking in the losses, as predicted by prospect theory, then due to the nonconvexity, the competitive equilibria are all on the boundaries of the Edgeworth box. The experimental results are that risk-seeking behavior is observed in many people and appears in markets as predicted. In addition, market behavior is consistent with answers to hypothetical questionnaires. Contrary to prospect theory, risk seeking seems to diminish with experience: preferences in the market setting are not labile; and risk-seeking preferences are not simply a result of framing effects.

Eight alternative methods of eliciting preferences between money and a consumption good are identified: two of these are standard willingness-to-accept and willingness-to-pay measures. These methods differ with respect to the reference point used and the dimension in which responses are expressed. The loss aversion hypothesis of Tversky and Kahneman's theory of reference-dependent preferences predicts systematic differences between the preferences elicited by these methods. These predictions are tested by eliciting individuals' preferences for two private consumption goods; the experimental design is incentive-compatible and controls for income and substitution effects. The theory's predictions are broadly confirmed.