In this study, we document evidence on the relation between auditor tenure and earnings quality using the dispersion and sign of both absolute Jones-model abnormal accruals and absolute current accruals as proxies for earnings quality. Our study is motivated by calls for “mandatory auditor rotation,” which are based on concerns that longer auditor tenure reduces earnings quality. Multivariate results, controlling for firm age, size, industry growth, cash flows, auditor type (Big N versus non-Big N), industry, and year, generally suggest higher earnings quality with longer auditor tenure. We interpret our results as suggesting that, in the current environment, longer auditor tenure, on average, results in auditors placing greater constraints on extreme management decisions in the reporting of financial performance.

In 1998, the SEC expressed concern that conference calls encourage selective disclosure by revealing new information to financial analysts privy to the call. This study investigates whether the regular use of earnings-related conference calls increases the amount of information available to financial analysts by examining the effect of conference calls on analysts' forecast error and dispersion. Results indicate that conference calls increase analysts' ability to forecast earnings accurately, suggesting that these calls increase the total information available about a firm. We also find some evidence that conference calls decrease dispersion among analysts. Given conference calls were generally restricted during our sample period, our evidence suggests that conference calls may have contributed to an information gap between analysts privy to the call and the remainder of the investment community. We also investigate whether conference calls differentially affect analysts' forecast errors depending on analysts' prior forecasting ability or brokerage-house affiliation. We find evidence suggesting that analysts with relatively weak prior forecasting performance benefit more from conference calls, suggesting that conference calls help “level the playing field” across analysts.

Executive stock options and convertible securities can increase the number of common shares outstanding while adding less than the market value of the newly issued securities to a firm's assets. We model the effect of expected dilution on the earnings/return relation. Expected dilution effectively reduces the permanence of an earnings innovation. Empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that dilutive securities attenuate the relation between earnings and returns. Estimated earnings response coefficients (ERCs) are significantly lower when there are shares reserved for conversion. The effect is more pronounced for firms that have experienced price increases or positive earnings news, as these increase the expected dilutive effect of conversions.

We construct a model of an exchange economy in which agents trade assets contingent on an observable signal, the probability of which depends on public opinion. The agents in our model are replaced occasionally, and each person updates beliefs in response to observed outcomes. We show that the distribution of the observed signal is described by a quasi-nonergodic process and that people continue to disagree with each other forever. These disagreements generate large wealth inequalities that arise from the multiplicative nature of wealth dynamics, which makes successful bold bets highly profitable.

We study the nonparametric identification of gross output production functions under the environment of the commonly employed proxy variable methods. We show that applying these methods to gross output requires additional sources of variation in the demand for flexible inputs (e.g., prices). Using a transformation of the firm’s first-order condition, we develop a new nonparametric identification strategy for gross output that can be employed even when additional sources of variation are not available. Monte Carlo evidence and estimates from Colombian and Chilean plant-level data show that our strategy performs well and is robust to deviations from the baseline setting.

We present a model of technologically interconnected countries that benefit and potentially contribute to advances in the world technology frontier. Greater inequality between successful and unsuccessful entrepreneurs increases entrepreneurial effort and a country’s contribution to that frontier. Under plausible assumptions, the world equilibrium is asymmetric, involving different economic institutions and technology levels for different countries. Some countries become technology leaders and opt for a type of “cutthroat” capitalism with greater inequality and innovations, while others free ride on the cutthroat incentives of the leaders and choose a more “cuddly” form of capitalism with greater social insurance for entrepreneurs.

We study the effect of constraints on chiefs' power on economic outcomes, citizens' attitudes, and social capital. A paramount chief in Sierra Leone must come from a ruling family originally recognized by British colonial authorities. In chiefdoms with fewer ruling families, chiefs face less political competition, and development outcomes are significantly worse today. Variation in the security of property rights over land is a potential mechanism. Paradoxically, with fewer ruling families, the institutions of chiefs' authority are more highly respected, and measured social capital is higher. We argue that these results reflect the capture of civil society organizations by chiefs.

Analyzing account-level data from an account aggregator, we find that households increase consumption when they receive expected tax refunds, as if they face liquidity constraints. However, these same households smooth consumption when making payments in other years, primarily by transferring funds among liquid accounts. Even households carrying credit card debt smooth consumption when making payments, and even highly liquid households spend out of refunds. This behavior is inconsistent with pure liquidity constraints or hand-to-mouth behavior and is most consistent with a mental accounting life-cycle model.

We compare two approaches to increasing tax revenue: tax administration and tax rates. We show that when Indonesia moved top regional firms into “medium taxpayer offices,” with high staff-to-taxpayer ratios, tax revenue more than doubled. Examining nonlinear changes to corporate income tax rates, we estimate an elasticity of taxable income of 0.579. Combining these estimates, improved tax administration is equivalent to raising top rates on all firms by 8 percentage points. On net, improved tax administration can have significant returns for developing countries.

School choice may lead to improvements in school productivity if parents’ choices reward effective schools and punish ineffective ones. This mechanism requires parents to choose schools based on causal effectiveness rather than peer characteristics. We study relationships among parent preferences, peer quality, and causal effects on outcomes for applicants to New York City’s centralized high school assignment mechanism. We use applicants’ rank-ordered choice lists to measure preferences and to construct selection-corrected estimates of treatment effects on test scores, high school graduation, college attendance, and college quality. Parents prefer schools that enroll high-achieving peers, and these schools generate larger improvements in short- and long-run student outcomes. Preferences are unrelated to school effectiveness and academic match quality after controlling for peer quality.