A company’s credit default swap spread is the cost per annum for protection against a default by the company. In this paper we analyze data on credit default swap spreads collected by a credit derivatives broker. We first examine the relationship between credit default spreads and bond yields and reach conclusions on the benchmark risk-free rate used by participants in the credit derivatives market. We then carry out a series of tests to explore the extent to which credit rating announcements by Moody’s are anticipated by participants in the credit default swap market

We examine the effect of credit default swaps (CDSs) on debt specialization. We argue that reference firms in CDS contracts, seeking to minimize creditor conflicts and bankruptcy costs, exhibit higher debt concentration than firms on which no CDSs are traded. Our results show that firms engage in greater debt specialization and are more likely to specialize following the inception of CDS trading. Additionally, we find that, while lender concentration in firms increases, the number of bank lenders drops, lead arranger share rises, and the probability that lead arrangers and lenders are repeated increases following the onset of CDS trading. Our results are robust to instrumental variable estimation, propensity-score matching, different model specifications, and different subsamples

Credit default risk for an obligor can be hedged with either a credit default swap (CDS) or a constant maturity credit default swap (CMCDS). We find strong evidence of persistent differences in the hedging cost associated with the two comparable contracts. Between 2001 and 2006, it would have been more profitable to sell CDS and buy CMCDS while after the crisis between 2008 and 2013 the opposite strategy was profitable. Panel data tests indicate that for our sample period the implied forward CDS rates are unbiased estimates of future spot CDS rates. The changes in the company implied volatility is the main determinant of trading inefficiencies, followed by the changes in GDP and in the interest rates before the crisis, and the changes in sentiment index and in the VIX after the crisis

While credit default swaps (CDSs) can be used to hedge credit risk exposures or to speculate, we examine another use of them: banks buy CDS referencing their borrowers to obtain regulatory capital relief. Such capital relief activities have unintended consequences, as banks extend riskier loans when they buy CDS to boost capital ratios. While capital-induced CDS-user banks achieve higher profitability during normal times, they perform worse and request more government support in crisis periods than other banks that use CDS for trading or speculation. Our findings suggest that banks’ CDS trading for capital relief purposes may make these banks riskier

We find firm cyclicality decreases by 40% after the inception of credit default swap (CDS) trading. The effect stems from CDS firms’ less aggressive asset growth in good times and is stronger for firms facing a more severe empty creditor problem. Important identification issues are addressed. The result cannot be explained with debt overhang, bank lending cyclicality, or the cyclicality of firms’ business fundamentals. It holds for the cyclicality of various corporate outcomes (inventories, cash, and employment). Importantly, CDS trading impedes unhealthy growth and enhances profitability and firm value. Our finding indicates an important positive real effect of financial innovation

This article provides evidence that firm value declines when credit default swaps (CDSs) are initiated and that the effect is greater when CDS trading activity is higher. This decline, which arises from an increase in the cost of capital as opposed to a decrease in free cash flows, traces to a deterioration in the firm’s credit quality and stock liquidity. Firm value declines less when CDS trading is likely to produce incremental information, suggesting that CDS trading has informational benefits for firm value. However, the evidence does not indicate that firm value increases because CDS availability facilitates investments

We analyze the impact of the introduction of credit default swaps (CDSs) on real decision-making within the firm. Our structural model predicts that CDS introduction increases debt capacity more when uncertainty about the credit events that trigger CDS payment is lower. Using a sample of more than 56,000 firms across 51 countries, we find that CDSs increase leverage more in legal and market environments where uncertainty about CDS obligations is reduced and when property rights are weaker. Our results highlight the importance of legal uncertainty in the interpretation of the underlying trigger events of global credit derivatives

This paper examines the impact of credit default swaps (CDS) on firms' financing and trade credit policies. Our results indicate firms with CDS trading on their debt increase their equity issuances. Further, firms with CDS trading on their debt and high levels of long-term debt issuances decrease their debt financing. Total and idiosyncratic risks are also higher for firms with CDS trading on their debt. These firms pay their suppliers and collect from their customers quicker. Thus, the impacts of the CDS market are not limited to the borrowing firms but also affect economically connected firms

Whether and how credit default swaps (CDSs) affect corporate debt structure remains an unanswered question. We find that firms use more public debt relative to bank debt when CDSs referencing their debt start trading. The results are robust to the endogeneity of CDS trading. Furthermore, the increase in public debt is concentrated in senior bonds and notes, which are the most common CDS reference assets. The effect of CDS trading is most pronounced when bond underwriters take a net selling CDS position and for informationally opaque firms. These findings suggest that the hedging and informational roles of CDSs have real effects on corporate debt structure

We show that credit default swap (CDS) trading on a firm's debt positively influences its technological innovation output measured by patents and patent citations. This positive effect is more pronounced in firms relying more on debt financing or being more subject to continuous monitoring by lenders prior to CDS trade initiation. Moreover, after CDS trade initiation, firms pursue more risky and original innovations and generate patents with higher economic value. Further analysis suggests that CDSs improve borrowing firms’ innovation output by enhancing lenders’ risk tolerance and borrowers’ risk- taking in the innovation process, rather than by increasing Research and Development (R&D) investment. Taken together, our findings reveal the real effects of CDSs on companies’ investments and technological progress