While credit default swaps (CDSs) can be used to hedge credit risk exposures or to speculate, we examine another use of them: banks buy CDS referencing their borrowers to obtain regulatory capital relief. Such capital relief activities have unintended consequences, as banks extend riskier loans when they buy CDS to boost capital ratios. While capital-induced CDS-user banks achieve higher profitability during normal times, they perform worse and request more government support in crisis periods than other banks that use CDS for trading or speculation. Our findings suggest that banks’ CDS trading for capital relief purposes may make these banks riskier

This study analyzes the motivations for and consequences of funds' credit default swap (CDS) investments using mutual funds' quarterly holdings from pre‐ to postfinancial crisis. Funds invest in CDS when facing unpredictable liquidity needs. Funds sell more in reference entities when the CDS is liquid relative to the underlying bonds and buy more when the CDS‐bond basis is more negative. To enhance yield, funds engage in negative basis trading and sell CDS with the highest spreads within rating categories, and with spreads higher than those of their bond portfolios. Funds with superior portfolio returns also demonstrate more skill in CDS trading

Using regulatory data on CDS holdings and corporate bond transactions, I provide evidence for a liquidity spillover effect from CDS to bond markets. Bond trading volumes are 70% larger for investors with CDS positions written on the debt issuer. Moreover, higher CDS trading activity substantially improves the liquidity of the underlying bonds, particularly around rating downgrades. Additional analyses reveal that the spillover effect is partly driven by naked CDS positions, highlighting one of the adverse consequences of naked CDS bans for bond markets. The results suggest that the presence of an accessible CDS market enhances the liquidity of the underlying bond market.

This paper examines whether the tone of corporate textual disclosures related to risk and uncertainty conveys relevant information to the credit default swap (CDS) market. Prior studies largely focus on the amount of risk disclosures and provide inconclusive evidence on the usefulness of risk disclosures for investors in assessing firm risk. Using a large sample of textual risk disclosures in the Management's Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section of 10‐K and 10‐Q filings, I predict and find that the change in CDS spreads over the three‐day window surrounding the 10‐K/Q filing date is positively associated with the pessimism of the language used in the risk disclosures. I conduct several analyses to show that the effect of the tone of risk disclosures is distinguishable from that of the amount of such disclosures. Cross‐sectional analyses reveal that the CDS market reaction to the tone of MD&A risk disclosures is more pronounced for reference entities closer to default, consistent with creditors' particular concern about downside risk. Further, the CDS market reacts more significantly to the tone of MD&A risk disclosures for reference entities with a weaker information environment. Overall, these results support the view that the tone of textual risk disclosures in MD&As has information content for investors in the CDS market in particular and debt markets in general. My findings improve the understanding of textual risk disclosures by showing that the tone and the amount of such disclosures have different implications for debt market investors' risk perceptions

This paper highlights the adverse consequences of sluggish credit rating updates in creating information efficiency distortions and investment anomalies. We first document significant credit default swap (CDS) return momentum yielding 7.1% per year. We further show that cross-market momentum strategies based on information in past CDS performance generates an alpha of 10.3% per year in stocks and 7.3% per year in bonds. These CDS momentum and cross-market effects are stronger among more liquid, informationally rich CDS contracts whose CDS spreads move in anticipation of important, yet slow-moving, credit rating changes. (JEL G12, G14) Received February 19, 2020; editorial decision July 10, 2020 by Editor Jeffrey Pontiff

This paper studies how the COVID-19 shock affects the CDS spread changes and abnormal stock returns of U.S. firms with different levels of debt rollover risk. We use the COVID-19 crisis as a quasi-natural experiment of adverse cash flow shock that increases the default risk of firms facing an immediate liquidity shortfall. We find that the COVID-19 shock significantly increased the CDS spread and decreased the shareholder value for firms facing higher debt rollover risk. The effect is stronger for non-financial firms, for firms that are financially constrained, and for firms that are highly volatile. Moreover, we find that firms with immediate refinancing needs suffered more than firms with distant refinancing needs during the COVID-19 shock, which further confirms that firms’ debt rollover risk is indeed a key factor that drives the heterogenous reactions to the shock. The paper provides fresh insights into the role of firms’ debt rollover risk during the COVID-19 health crisis

Since the global financial crisis, interest rate swap rates, which represent future uncollateralized interbank borrowing, have fallen below maturity-matched Treasury rates. This is surprising, because US Treasuries, which are deemed expensive because of superior liquidity and safety, should produce yields that are lower than those of swap rates. We show, by no-arbitrage, that sovereign default risk explains negative swap spreads even without frictions such as balance sheet constraints, convenience yield, and hedging demand. We support this explanation with an equilibrium model that jointly accounts for macroeconomic fundamentals and the term structures of interest and US credit default swap rates

We study the impact of stronger shareholder control on bondholders. We find that the passage of shareholder-sponsored governance proposals causes a decline in credit default swap spreads, indicating a net positive effect on bondholders. Evidence suggests that the direct benefit of stronger shareholder control, through the “management disciplining” channel, is larger than the combined adverse effects of directly escalating shareholder-bondholder conflict and indirectly exacerbating exposure to shareholder opportunism. Results are stronger for firms with existing high levels of shareholder-bondholder conflict and for proposals that mitigate managerial entrenchment without exacerbating risk-shifting. Finally, stronger shareholder control improves credit ratings and operating performance in the long-term

We use the advent of new credit default swap (CDS) trading conventions in April 2009—the CDS Big Bang—to study how a shock to funding liquidity impacts market liquidity. After the Big Bang, traders are required to pay upfront fees to execute CDS transactions, with the size of the fees depending on the level of CDS spreads. While CDS bid-ask spreads decline in aggregate after the Big Bang, they do so less for contracts that require larger fees. Furthermore, the funding effect is stronger for smaller and riskier firms and for noncentrally cleared contracts. The effect also becomes stronger after Deutsche Bank's exit