We test the limits of arbitrage argument for the survival of irrationality-induced financial anomalies by sorting securities on their individual residual variability as a proxy for idiosyncratic risk – a commonly asserted limit to arbitrage – and comparing the strength of anomalous returns in low versus high residual variability portfolios. We find no support for the limits of arbitrage argument to explain undervaluation anomalies (small value stocks, value stocks generally, recent winners, and positive earnings surprises) but strong support for the limits of arbitrage argument to explain overvaluation anomalies (small growth stocks, growth stocks generally, recent losers, and negative earnings surprises). Other tests also fail to support the limits of arbitrage argument for the survival of overvaluation anomalies and suggest that at least some of the factor premiums for size, book-to-market, and momentum are unrelated to irrationality protected by limits to arbitrage

Limits to arbitrage arise because financial intermediaries may face funding constraints when mispricing worsens. Using a model with limits to arbitrage, where we allow arbitrageurs to secure capital even in case of underperformance, we show that arbitrageurs that are more protected from withdrawals have more mean-reverting and volatile returns. Using data on hedge fund performance, we find robust support for these hypotheses: Funds with contractual impediments to withdrawals, and funds with performance-insensitive outflows, recover more quickly after a bad year and have more volatile returns. Our evidence is consistent with the idea that some hedge funds overcome the limits to arbitrage

This study examines how limits of arbitrage can affect the pricing of idiosyncratic volatility. Using both unique trading constraints in the Chinese stock market and other commonly-used limits-of-arbitrage measures, we construct a comprehensive limits-of-arbitrage index. Based on this index, we find that the negative idiosyncratic volatility return premium is much stronger and more persistent in stocks with high limits of arbitrage. Furthermore, the existing explanations about the idiosyncratic volatility return premium cannot fully explain what we find about the role of limits of arbitrage in the pricing of idiosyncratic volatility in the Chinese stock market. Our study suggests that the trading constraints introduced in the name of protecting individual investors can actually hurt them, since these additional limits of arbitrage will increase the inefficiency of the security market

We examine the investor sentiment and limits-to-arbitrage explanations for the positive cross-sectional relation between cash holdings and future stock returns. Consistent with the investor sentiment hypothesis, we find that the cash holding effect is significant when sentiment is low, and it is insignificant when sentiment is high. In addition, the cash holding effect is strong among stocks with high transaction costs, high short selling costs, and large idiosyncratic volatility, indicating that arbitrage on the cash holding effect is costly and risky. In line with the limits-to-arbitrage hypothesis, high costs and risk prevent rational investors from exploiting the cash holding effect

We empirically evaluate the predictions of the mispricing hypothesis with limits-to-arbitrage suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and the q-theory with investment frictions proposed by Li and Zhang (2010) on the negative relation between asset growth and average stock returns. We conduct cross-sectional regressions of returns on asset growth on subsamples split by a given measure of limits-to-arbitrage or investment frictions. We show that: (i) proxies for limits-to-arbitrage and proxies for investment frictions are often highly correlated; (ii) the evidence based on equal-weighted returns shows significant support for both hypotheses, while the evidence from value-weighted returns is weaker; and (iii) in direct comparisons, each hypothesis is supported by a fair and similar amount of evidence

We propose a parsimonious, comprehensive proxy for innovations in limited arbitrage: innovations in ETFs’ premium. Consistent with a common component, we confirm limited arbitrage factors, LAFs, constructed from ETFs’ premium innovations spanning four asset classes are correlated. Further, we find that equity LAFs are negatively priced in the cross-section of stock returns. Our pricing tests also confirm that LAFs provide pricing information beyond well-known limits of arbitrage: illiquidity and idiosyncratic volatility. Overall, our findings suggest that limited arbitrage risk is priced and LAF is a relevant risk-factor

We propose a model of limited arbitrage based on financial relationships. Financially constrained arbitrageurs may choose to seek additional financing from banks that have the technology to profit from the strategies themselves. A holdup problem arises because banks cannot commit to providing capital. To minimize competition, arbitrageurs will choose to stay constrained and underinvest in the arbitrage unless banks have sufficient reputational capital. This problem arises when mispricing is largest. More competition among financiers, higher arbitrageur wealth, and allowing for explicit contracts can worsen the holdup problem. When arbitrage is risky, financial relationships are more valuable, mitigating the problem

Classic option pricing theory values a derivative contract via dynamic delta hedging and treating the contract as redundant relative to the underlying security. Dynamic delta hedging proves highly effective in practice, but the remaining risk is still large because of the practical limits of arbitrage. Derivatives can play primary roles in risk allocation. This paper quantifies the percentage variance reduction of delta hedging on U.S. stock options, proposes a top-down return attribution framework to identify the remaining risk sources of the delta-hedged option investment, and constructs a statistical return factor model to explain the variations of the delta-hedged option returns

A diversified portfolio of risk arbitrage positions produces an abnormal return of 0.6–0.9% per month over the period from 1981 to 1996. We trace these profits to practical limits on risk arbitrage. In our model of risk arbitrage, arbitrageurs’ risk-bearing capacity is constrained by deal completion risk and the size of the position they hold. Consistent with this model, we document that the returns to risk arbitrage increase in an ex ante measure of completion risk and target size. We also examine the influence of the general supply of arbitrage capital, measured by the total equity holdings of arbitrageurs, on arbitrage profits

We document the existence of a strategy designed to circumvent limits to arbitrage. Faced with short-sale constraints and noise trader risk, small arbitrageurs publicly reveal their information to induce the target’s shareholders (“the longs”) to sell, thereby accelerating price discovery. Using data for 124 short-sale campaigns in the United States between 2006 and 2011, we show that investors respond strongly to the information, with spikes in SEC filing views, volatility, order imbalances, realized spreads, turnover, and selling by the longs. Share prices fall by an aggregate $14.8 billion. Our findings imply that even extreme short-sale constraints need not constrain arbitrage