This paper studies moral hazard in banking due to delegated monitoring in an environment of aggregate risk and examines its implications for credit market equilibrium and regulation, in a model where banks are price competitors for loans and deposits. It provides a rationale for an incentive-based lending capacity positively linked to the bank's capital and profit margin, for an oligopolistic market structure wherever banks have market power, and for capital requirements. Social-welfare-maximizing capital requirements are lowered in recessions, are higher the more fragmented the banking sector, and are increased when anti-competitive measures are removed. In equilibrium banks earn excessive profits and credit may be rationed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, G28, L13

We construct a degree-of-total-leverage framework to test whether and how shifts in product mix affect earnings volatility at 472 U.S. commercial banks between 1988 and 1995. Our framework, which accounts for cost and revenue synergies not captured in most previous studies, conceptually links earnings volatility to revenue volatility, expense fixity, and product mix. We find that replacing traditional lending activities with fee-based activities—an ongoing trend that may be strengthened by recent financial modernization—is associated with both higher revenue volatility and higher total leverage, which in this framework implies higher earnings volatility. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G21, G32, D24.

This study analyzes effects on debt and equity claimants of asset sales into securitizations. Shareholders' returns are increasing in shareholder capitalization. Average losses to shareholders in mortgage-backed securities issuers are explained historically. First time issuance and increased securitization frequency are shareholder-wealth-increasing. Securitizers with actively traded bonds enjoy substantial and significant shareholder gains, which are greater the poorer the creditworthiness of the seller. Wealth transfer from bondholders to shareholders occurs in asset-backed securities among sellers with low credit ratings. Banks' claimants have benefited significantly more than other FIs' claimants, suggesting that securitization can alleviate regulatory burden. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: G14, G21.

This paper provides a detailed analysis of the call auction procedure on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. We develop a direct measure of execution costs in a call auction that is comparable to the bid–ask spread in a continuous market. We find that transaction costs for small transactions in the call market are lower than the quoted spread in the continuous market, whereas transaction costs for large transactions in the call market are higher than the spread in the continuous market. An analysis of specialist (Makler) participation shows that Maklers provide a valuable service to the market. On average, their compensation is restricted to commission income rather than trading profits. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: G10

This paper examines incremental debt financing decisions of large Asian firms over the period 1989–1998. We find that flotation costs, agency costs, and renegotiation and liquidation risk affect the choice of debt type and that firms in countries with well developed private bond markets have a higher probability of accessing international bond markets. Significant differences exist between the determinants of choice of debt type across Japanese and non-Japanese firms that cannot be explained by keiretsu associations. Moreover, there is no significant difference in the determinants of financing source for Japanese firms across independent firms, horizontal keiretsus, and vertical keiretsus. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: F39, G15, G21, G32

A number of developing countries have adopted deficit finance regimes involving multiple- (currency and bond) reserve requirements. A key characteristic of these regimes is that the real interest rates on reservable bonds are higher than the real return rates on currency, so that the nominal interest rates on the bonds are positive. We seek an efficiency-based explanation for the existence of multiple-reserve regimes and for this key characteristic. We find that there are economies in which some of the efficient allocations can be supported only by multiple-reserve requirements, and that positive nominal bond rates may be needed to support some of these allocations. We also find that there are economies in which allocations supported by multiple-reserve regimes with negative nominal bond rates Pareto dominate single-reserve allocations, even when the latter are efficient relative to other single-reserve allocations. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E42, E58, H62.

We explore the optimal financial contract for a large investor with potential control over a firm's investment decisions. An optimal menu of claims resembles a U.S. version of lender liability doctrine—equitable subordination. This doctrine permits the court to subordinate a controlling investor's claim in bankruptcy, but only under well-specified conditions. It allows a firm to strike an efficient balance between: (i) inducing the large investor to monitor, and (ii) limiting the influence costs that arise when claimants can challenge existing contracts. We provide a partial rationale for a financial system in which powerful creditors do not hold blended debt and equity claims. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G20, G33, K22.