We test a new hypothesis that may help explain the procyclicality of bank lending. The institutional memory hypothesis is driven by deterioration in the ability of loan officers over the bank's lending cycle that results in an easing of credit standards. We test this hypothesis using data from individual US banks over 1980–2000: over 200,000 bank-level observations on commercial loan growth, over 2,000,000 loan-level observations on interest rate premiums, and over 2000 bank-level observations on credit standards and loan spreads from bank management survey responses. The empirical analysis supports the hypothesis, although there are differences by bank size class.

The empirical evidence on initial returns in IPOs reveals average overpricing as well as underpricing, depending on the type of security offered for sale. Consistent with this evidence, the present paper develops a model in which an IPO may be overpriced in equilibrium relative to its expected (or average) aftermarket price. Overpricing disappears, however, once the offer price is compared to a ‘float-weighted’ expectation, where the weights are given by the extent to which the number of securities that are floated in the offering (at the posted price) is positively related to the demand for allocations. Empirically, the model implies that equally-weighted returns underestimate initial returns in IPOs, and hence that inferences based on equally-weighted returns may be misleading

This paper investigates a firm's choice between borrowing from a single bank and from two banks. The focus is on how this decision affects banks' equilibrium monitoring intensities and loan rates. Two-bank lending suffers from duplication of effort and sharing of monitoring benefits, but it benefits from diseconomies of scale in monitoring. Thus, two-bank lending involves lower monitoring but not necessarily higher loan rates than single-bank lending. The optimal borrowing structure balances the benefit of monitoring for the firm in terms of higher success probability of the project against its drawbacks of lower expected private return and higher total monitoring costs. In contrast to the previous theoretical literature, the model lays down an explanation for the empirical observation that multiple-bank lending does not unambiguously increase loan rates or firms' quality, in particular in small business lending

Speculation creates an adverse selection cost for utility traders, who will choose not to trade if this cost exceeds the benefits of using the asset market. However, if they do not participate, the market collapses, since private information alone is not sufficient to create a motive for trade. There is, therefore, a limit to the number of speculative transactions that a given market can support. This paper compares this limit in decentralized, monopoly-intermediated and competitively-intermediated market regimes, finding that the second regime is best equipped to deal with speculation: an informed monopolist can price-discriminate investors and thus always avoid market breakdowns. These regimes are also compared in terms of welfare and trading volume. The analysis suggests a reason for the presence of intermediaries in financial markets

The on-going reform of the Basel Accord relies on three “pillars”: a new capital adequacy requirement, supervisory review and market discipline. This article develops a simple continuous-time model of commercial banks' behavior where interaction between these three instruments can be analyzed. We study the conditions under which market discipline can reduce the minimum capital requirements needed to prevent moral hazard. We also discuss regulatory forbearance issues.