We quantify the effects of lending and balance sheet channels on corporate investment during large devaluations. We find that if currency crises are accompanied by banking crises, domestic exporters holding unhedged foreign currency debt decrease investment while foreign exporters with better access to credit increase investment despite their unhedged foreign currency debt. We do not find such a differential effect under pure currency crises. Using firm-bank matched data during the global financial crisis, we showthat both domestic and foreign-owned firms experienced a decline in bank credit from affected banks; however, foreign-owned firms substituted the lost credit.

Starting in the early 1990s, countries in southern Europe experienced low productivity growth alongside declining real interest rates. We use data for manufacturing firms in Spain between 1999 and 2012 to document a significant increase in the dispersion of the return to capital across firms, a stable dispersion of the return to labor, and a significant increase in productivity losses from capital misallocation over time. We develop a model with size-dependent financial frictions that is consistent with important aspects of firms’ behavior in production and balance sheet data. We illustrate how the decline in the real interest rate, often attributed to the euro convergence process, leads to a significant decline in sectoral total factor productivity as capital inflows are misallocated toward firms that have higher net worth but are not necessarily more productive. We show that similar trends in dispersion and productivity losses are observed in Italy and Portugal but not in Germany, France, and Norway.

Risk Sharing and Industrial Specialization: Regional and International Evidence by Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, Bent E. Sørensen and Oved Yosha. Published in volume 93, issue 3, pages 903-918 of American Economic Review, June 2003

We analyze the impact of financial globalization on business cycle synchronization using a proprietary database on banks’ international exposure for industrialized countries during 1978 to 2006. Theory makes ambiguous predictions and identification has been elusive due to lack of bilateral time‐varying financial linkages data. In contrast to conventional wisdom and previous empirical studies, we identify a strong negative effect of banking integration on output synchronization, conditional on global shocks and country‐pair heterogeneity. Similarly, we show divergent economic activity due to higher integration using an exogenous de‐jure measure of integration based on financial regulations that harmonized EU markets.

We examine the empirical role of different explanations for the lack of capital flows from rich to poor countries—the “Lucas Paradox.” The theoretical explanations include cross-country differences in fundamentals affecting productivity, and capital market imperfections. We show that during 1970–2000, low institutional quality is the leading explanation. Improving Peru's institutional quality to Australia's level implies a quadrupling of foreign investment. Recent studies emphasize the role of institutions for achieving higher levels of income but remain silent on the specific mechanisms. Our results indicate that foreign investment might be a channel through which institutions affect long-run development.

This article studies the transmission of the Global Financial Cycle (GFC) to domestic credit market conditions in a large emerging market, Turkey, over 2003–13. We use administrative data covering the universe of corporate credit transactions matched to bank balance sheets to document four facts: (1) an easing in global financial conditions leads to lower borrowing costs and an increase in local lending; (2) domestic banks more exposed to international capital markets transmit the GFC locally; (3) the fall in local currency borrowing costs is larger than foreign currency borrowing costs due to the co-movement of the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) premium with the GFC over time; (4) data on posted collateral for new loan issuances show that collateral constraints do not relax during the boom phase of the GFC.

The magnitude and the direction of net international capital flows do not fit neoclassical models. The fifty U.S. states comprise an integrated capital market with very low barriers to capital flows, which makes them an ideal testing ground for neoclassical models. We develop a simple frictionless open economy model with perfectly diversified ownership of capital and find that capital flows among the states are consistent with the model. Therefore, the small size and “wrong” direction of net international capital flows are likely due to frictions associated with national borders, not to inherent flaws in the neoclassical model.