Journal Article An Engineer's View of the Problem of Economic Stability and Economic Regulation Get access A. Tustin A. Tustin Birmingham Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 19, Issue 2, 1951, Pages 85–89, https://doi.org/10.2307/2295736 Published: 01 July 1951

Journal Article A Comment on Factor Price Equalisation Get access Paul A. Samuelson Paul A. Samuelson Cambridge, Massachusetts Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 19, Issue 2, 1951, Pages 121–122, https://doi.org/10.2307/2295740 Published: 01 July 1951

Journal Article Comment Get access M. A. Adelman M. A. Adelman Massachusetts Institute of Technology Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 65, Issue 2, May 1951, Pages 280–283, https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/65.2.280 Published: 01 May 1951

Journal Article Note on Price Discrimination and the A & P Case Get access Rashi Fein Rashi Fein Johns Hopkins University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 65, Issue 2, May 1951, Pages 271–280, https://doi.org/10.2307/1879538 Published: 01 May 1951

I. Introduction, 62. — II. Some salient features of a banking market, 63. — III. Prices, profits, costs, 69. — IV. Banking market structure in small market towns and large cities, 73. — V. Impact of horizontal combination on banking structures, 79. — VI. Concluding observations, 83.

Journal Article Taxes and Subsidies in Leontief's Input-Output Model Get access Lloyd A. Metzler Lloyd A. Metzler University of Chicago Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 65, Issue 3, August 1951, Pages 433–438, https://doi.org/10.2307/1882224 Published: 01 August 1951

I. The men who wrote above their time, 150. — II. The Ricardians, 157. — III. Malthus, 169. — IV. Archbishop Whately and Professor Senior, 172. — V. Some of those who also ran, 175.

A model was constructed that incorporates rational grounds for the choice by two individuals between an employment contract and a contract of the ordinary kind (which we have called a sales contract). By a generalization of this model one can account for the fact that in an employment contract certain aspects of the workers's behavior are stipulated in the contract terms, certain other aspects are placed within the authority of the employer, and still other aspects are left to the worker's choice. Since administrative theory was interested in explaining behavior within the framework of employment relations, and economic theory in explaining behavior within the area of market relations, the model suggests one possible way of relating these two bodies of theory. The most serious limitations of the model lie in the assumptions of rational utility-maximizing behavior incorporated in it. (Author)