Abstract We show there is a much stronger negative, dynamic relation between changes in economic uncertainty and Treasury yields over weaker economic times since at least 1990. We document this economic-state variation in uncertainty-yield dynamics for weekly and monthly change horizons, for nominal yields and real-yield proxies, for multiple economic-state identification methods, and for different economic uncertainty metrics. We present additional findings that suggest short-term fluctuations in precautionary-savings and consumption-smoothing forces are more impactful on interest rate dynamics during weaker economic times, especially relying on surveys of expected economic growth and inflation. Received February 8, 2019; editorial decision August 24, 2020 by Editor Nikolai Roussanov. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Abstract Mutual fund returns are significantly related to stock characteristics in the cross-section after controlling for risk via factor models. We develop a new double-adjusted approach that controls for both factor model betas and stock characteristics in one performance measure. The new measure substantially affects performance rankings, with a quarter of funds experiencing a change in their percentile ranking greater than 10. Double-adjusted performance produces strong evidence of persistence in relative performance. Inference based on the new measure often differs, sometimes dramatically, from that based on traditional performance estimates. Received November 22, 2019; editorial decision June 28, 2020; Editor: Jeffrey Pontiff. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix,which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Abstract We examine whether broad-based public engagement by institutional investors influences the behavior of portfolio firms. We investigate this question in the context of BlackRock’s annual Dear CEO letter, which in recent years has called for portfolio firms to acknowledge and quantify the impact of environmental and regulatory factors on their firms. We find that portfolio firms’ disclosures during the post-letter period reflect topics similar to those discussed in the letters, controlling for a variety of firm and disclosure characteristics and the occurrence of private engagements. Moreover, BlackRock appears to value these additional disclosures, as it more often votes with management on shareholder proposals during subsequent annual shareholder meetings. Finally, motivated by BlackRock’s attempts to mobilize firms toward its specific policy recommendations, we also provide some evidence that firms’ lobbying efforts during the post-letter period become more aligned with the issues highlighted in the letter, especially when firms’ share BlackRock’s policy preferences ex ante. Taken together, our evidence suggests that portfolio firms are responsive to BlackRock’s public engagement efforts.

I examine the demand for public information by local and nonlocal investors. Using novel data on institutional investors' requests for financial information from the SEC, I document that investors acquire approximately 20% more financial information for their local investments. This pattern holds after controlling for investors’ 13(f) portfolio holdings. I further demonstrate that this pattern is concentrated in stocks eliciting behavioral biases as well as among investors with strong company relationships. Consistent with public information acquisition being more beneficial to local investors, I find that local investors exhibit both enhanced timeliness in acquiring public information and superior portfolio trading decisions when acquiring public information (on the order of 0.5% per quarter). In sum, these results provide evidence that investors demand more, and benefit more from, public information on local investments.

Abstract We document changes in borrowers’ sensitivity to negative equity and show heightened borrower default propensity as a fundamental driver of crisis period mortgage defaults. Estimates of a time-varying coefficient competing risk hazard model reveal a marked run-up in the default option beta from 0.2 during 2003–06 to about 1.5 during 2012–13. Simulation of 2006 vintage loan performance shows that the marked upturn in the default option beta resulted in a doubling of mortgage default incidence. Panel data analysis indicates that much of the variation in default option exercise is associated with the local business cycle and consumer distress. Results also indicate elevated default propensities in sand states and among borrowers seeking a crisis-period Home Affordable Modification Program loan modification.

Financial corruption has an extensive adverse impact on corporate stakeholders. Over the last two decades, numerous prescriptions have been offered to improve the governance of US public firms, yet financial corruption is still prevalent. Board of directors' audit committees are typically charged with the responsibility of assuring that the corporation's financial reports satisfy the criterion of accuracy. We propose that a quad-qualified audit committee director can serve as an exemplar corporate overseer of financial reporting and minimize the likelihood of corruption. We predict that by having the qualifications of independence, directorship experience and financial expertise, bandwidth, and stock ownership, the effectiveness of monitoring financial reporting by such a director will be considerably enhanced, thus complementing the benefits of the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) enacted in 2002. To test our predictions, we employed a time-lagged, matched-pairs sample of 328 large US corporations (164 financially corrupt firms plus a comparison group of 164 compliant firms). Controlling for covariates, we found that the presence of a quad-qualified audit committee director reduced the likelihood of financial corruption in a public firm by 72%. Combined with the benefits from SOX, having at least one quad-qualified audit committee director decreased the probability of financial corruption by 92%. Our results also show that having just one quad-qualified audit committee director is more effective than the combination of the individual qualifications dispersed among the committee members.

This paper examines the implications of market anticipation of impending merger and acquisition (M&A) deals on the assessment of acquirer wealth effects through event study methods. We find evidence suggesting that prior studies have understated the gains to acquirers. The documented negative or near-zero abnormal returns to acquirers appears to be confined to sub-samples of highly-anticipated deals. By contrast, unanticipated acquirers gain significantly from M&As, achieving average cumulative abnormal returns of 5.4% to 7.5% in the seven days around the bid announcement. Empirically, we show that market anticipation partly explains (1) the documented low returns to acquirers, (2) the positive abnormal return spillover to close rivals of acquirers, and (3) the declining returns to serial acquirers across successive deals. Overall, our study provides evidence against several stylised facts and sheds light on the puzzle that M&A activity persists despite recurrent research findings that they do not create value for acquirers.

Abstract We consider a macroprudential approach to analyze the optimal lending policy for the central bank, focusing on spillover effects that policy exerts on money markets. Lending against high-quality collateral protects central banks against losses, but can adversely affect liquidity creation in markets since high-quality collateral gets locked up with the central bank rather than circulating in markets. Lending against low-quality collateral creates counterparty risk but can improve liquidity in markets. We illustrate the optimal policy incorporating these trade-offs. Contrary to what is generally accepted, lending against high-quality collateral can have negative effects, whereas it may be optimal to lend against low-quality collateral.

Until the 1970s, both banks and nonfinancial corporations relied on performance targets linked to their earnings per share (EPS). Over the next few decades, banks rapidly changed to emphasize return on equity (ROE) as a performance target. Investors seem aware of this change because ROE growth (EPS growth) better explains banks’ (nonfinancials’) stock market values. Also, manager compensation linked to ROE is more common for banks than for nonfinancials. This paper presents a model of a bank subject to fixed-rate deposit insurance and facing increasing competition that erodes its charter value. When the bank chooses its capital to maximize its shareholder value, its performance based on ROE appears better than its performance based on EPS. Thus, the increase in competition that started in the 1970s, along with fixed-rate deposit insurance, may explain banks’ growing preference for ROE over EPS as a performance target.