This study examines whether auditors can improve their judgment by drawing on the crowd within—that is, making the same judgment twice and averaging the two responses. Improvements in judgment are of special interest to auditors given that poor judgment threatens audit effectiveness and efficiency. The results from my experiment suggest that drawing on the crowd within helps auditors better use their task‐relevant knowledge, leading to more accurate auditor judgments relative to the judgments of an expert panel. Also, auditors can employ different task‐relevant knowledge that leads to more justifiable judgments when they are prompted (vs. not prompted) to make a limited, intuitive initial judgment as they draw on the crowd within. Overall, auditors appear to increase their task‐relevant knowledge as they develop expertise but do not appear to better use that knowledge absent intervention. Auditors can manipulate how they draw on the crowd within to achieve different audit objectives—for example, accuracy versus justifiability.

We hypothesize that managers use their hierarchical role as reviewers of accounting judgments and estimates to manage earnings, which we call indirect earnings management (IEM). Across a series of experiments using highly experienced financial executives as participants, we provide evidence that IEM (1) is likely used by managers to achieve current and future earnings targets, (2) reduces both cognitive dissonance associated with managing earnings and the extent to which managers think that their behaviors constitute earnings management, and (3) is more likely to be used when corporate governance is strong than when corporate governance is weak. The results of this study suggest new directions for future research on earnings management and highlight the important role of the hierarchical structure of the accounting function in efforts to understand how earnings are managed.

Regulators and researchers have expressed concerns that social interaction leads auditors to unjustifiably trust managers, constituting a lack of sufficient professional skepticism. Using both an abstract laboratory experiment and a contextually rich experiment with practicing auditors we predict and find that higher Dark Triad auditors (those with higher levels of the shared core between psychopathy, narcissism, and Machiavellianism) are relatively more resistant to lapses in professional skepticism due to the effects of social interaction. This is likely driven by higher Dark Triad auditors' callousness, lack of empathy, and lack of response to social stimuli. In contrast, while higher social interaction initially increases lower Dark Triad auditors' unjustified trust in managers, this effect reverses in subsequent interactions when lower Dark Triad auditors observe evidence suggesting managers have reported aggressively. These findings add to research on the effect of auditor personality traits, audit‐client social interaction, and the interaction of these two variables, and suggest that practitioners and researchers account for the interplay of Dark Triad traits and social interaction and their effect on professional skepticism.