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Corporate governance and dividend policy: Evidence of tunneling from master limited partnerships

Journal of Corporate Finance 2018 53, 106-132
Using a sample of 85 Delaware master limited partnerships (“MLPs”) from 2004 to 2016, we examine the relation between cash dividend policy and the strength of corporate governance measured by contractual governance provisions, such as fiduciary waiver, mandatory distributions, and voting rights, and by ownership structure. We find support for the tunneling model of dividend determination. Specifically, we document that firms with weaker governance pay out more cash dividends than better governed firms. We also find that, in the presence of low quality governance, these payments reduce firm value as well as the value of the firm's cash holdings, suggesting that they are viewed by the market as a tunneling (extraction) of resources by the general partner at the expense of limited unitholders.

The consequences of expanded audit reporting: implications of tax key audit matters for tax attribute valuation and auditor-provided tax services

Review of Accounting Studies 2025 30(4), 3894-3953 open access
This study examines the consequences of tax key audit matters (KAMs) to the valuation of tax attributes and to auditor-provided tax services (APTS). The literature finds that KAM adoption is not associated with investor or audit outcomes, creating an impetus to identify whether specific KAM topics are more consequential. Tax KAMs are an ideal setting because they are prevalent, taxes are economically important, and auditors can provide tax services to their clients. We find that investors discount the tax avoidance and deferred tax assets of tax-KAM companies, suggesting an incentive for managers to avoid tax KAMs. Consistent with self-interest threats to auditor independence, we find that receiving a tax KAM is negatively associated with clients’ concurrent purchases of APTS, but that clients increase their future purchases of these services when they stop receiving tax KAMs. These results reveal novel consequences of tax KAMs to the valuation of companies’ tax attributes and to APTS incentives.