Using federal judge ideology as an exogenous measure of issuing firms’ litigation risk, we document that the initial public offerings (IPOs) of the firms headquartered in more liberal circuits are more underpriced. The effect is mitigated when plaintiffs’ pleading standards are more stringent and is amplified when judges have more discretion in their decisions. The effect is also amplified among deep pocketed issuing firms, while it is mitigated among issuing firms hiring reputable intermediaries in the IPO process. The results of additional analysis suggest that issuing firms located in more liberal circuits are more likely to become targets of lawsuits after their IPOs and that these lawsuits are less likely to be dismissed by the courts and result in larger settlements. Collectively, our findings underscore the salience of litigation risk stemming from the issuing firms’ legal environment in driving IPO underpricing.

Our primary contribution to the finance literature is the introduction of folklore narratives as a major factor in influencing corporate outcomes. Using the initial public offering (IPO) underpricing as the main focus, we demonstrate that folklore narratives depicting lower tolerance toward antisocial behavior are associated with lower IPO underpricing. The relation between folklore narratives and IPO pricing is independent of indicators of trust, religion, culture, societal preferences, or institutional democracy. This relation is weaker in countries with a more transparent information environment and following reforms that improve disclosure and corporate governance. Folklore narratives on punishment for antisocial behavior are also related to enhanced information disclosure, lower agency problems, better long-term performance for IPO firms, higher proceeds raised and free float, and overall IPO activity in the market. Collectively, we show that informal institutions, such as folklore narratives, exert a strong influence on IPO outcomes globally.