It is well known that stock returns, on average, are negative on Mondays. Yet, it is less well known that this finding is substantially the consequence of returns in prior trading sessions. When Friday's return is negative, Monday's return is negative nearly 80 percent of the time with a mean return of −0.61 percent. When Friday's return is positive, the subsequent Monday's mean return is positive, 0.11 percent. This relationship is stronger than for any other pair of trading days and is most acute in small- and medium-size companies. The trading behavior of individual investors appears to be at least one factor contributing to this pattern. Individual investors are more active sellers of stock on Mondays, particularly following bad news in the market.

The study of the influence of combinations upon industrial stabilization is socially significant, 608. — Growth and general character of the products of the iron and steel industry, 609. — The five-year moving average used as a basis for measuring fluctuations in production, 610. — Comparison of average deviations from our moving average in the cases of pig iron, crude steel, and rolled iron and steel show greater fluctuation in output since the establishment of the Steel Corporation than before it, 612. — Annual fluctuations since 1901 are more abrupt and pronounced in years of depression than in years of expansion, 616. — They average less in the war and post-war years than in the period immediately preceding the war, 616. — Output of rails for the years 1880–1901 and 1902–22 shows less difference in average deviation than steel products generally; but during the period 1902–15, when prices were rigidly fixed, fluctuations were very great, 618. — Average numbers of workers employed each year by the Steel Corporation show less deviation from our moving average than do figures for output, 622. — The larger percentages for variation in production during the period succeeding the establishment of the Steel Corporation are due to large and drastic curtailments in years of depression, 626. — The promptness with which recovery takes place may furnish some support for the contention that in the long run price stabilization makes for industrial stabilization, 630.

Price policy of the Steel Corporation has been conservative, 2. — The Corporation has no monopoly, 5. — Prices of "finished steel" before and after the organization of the Steel Corporation and before and after the outbreak of the World War, 10. — Extreme fluctuations in the prices of "finished steel" much less during the years 1902 to 1914 than during the periods preceding the formation of the Corporation and after 1915, 14. — Prices of steel billets after the middle eighties show a similar lessening in fluctuations during the years 1902 to 1914, 17. — Prices of steel rails show a pronounced stabilizing influence after the formation of the Steel Corporation, 21. — Influence of pools and associations, and contrast in price movements between billets and rails, 22. — Results of price comparisons show that prior to the World War fluctuations were greatly reduced after the organization of the Steel Corporation, but with the exception of rail quotations, were again increased under the strain of war conditions, 23. — Question of monopoly and price stabilization, 29.

Importance of iron-ore reserves of Lorraine, 531. — Comparison with reserves of other countries, 534. — Quality and location of French reserves, 535. — Dependence of German steel industry upon Lorraine, 536.— Also of French steel industry, 538. — Probable French policy of control, 540. — Coal production of France and Germany, 544. — Importance of the Saar district, 547. — German pre-war view of importance of controlling iron in the interest of militancy, 552.

Extraordinary rise of iron and steel prices in 1916 and 1917, 598. — Comparison with conditions of 1899–1900, 601. — Four main problems involved in government regulation, 603. — Price announcement of September, 1917; nature of reductions, 610. — Further announcements, 612. — Prices maintained in January, 1918; slightly revised in March, 615. — Further slight revision in June, 617. — Conclusion, 618.

The objective of this paper is to address the issue of choosing between currency forward and currency futures contracts when hedging against currency risk within a stochastic interest rates environment. We compare between the hedging effectiveness of the two derivative assets both within a narrow sense (i.e., volatility minimization) and within a wide sense (i.e., risk-return trade-off). When judging hedging effectiveness in the narrow sense, forward and futures contracts give identical results even if they do not have identical prices. When judging hedging effectiveness in the wide sense, the choice between the two contracts is determined by the correlation between the domestic and the foreign term structures dynamics.

An exponentially small departure from the common knowledge assumption on the number T of repetitions of the prisoners' dilemma already enables cooperation. More generally, with such a departure, any feasible individually rational outcome of any one-shot game can be approximated by an equilibrium of a finitely repeated version of that game. The departure from common knowledge is small in the following sense:(1) the players know T with precision +/-K; (2) with probability 1 - epsilon, the players know T precisely; moreover, this knowledge is mutual of order epsilon T; and (3) the deviation of T from its finite expectation is exponentially small.