We consider an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) who faces competition from an independent remanufacturer (IR). The OEM decides the quality of the new product, which also determines the quality of the competing remanufactured product. The OEM and the IR then competitively determine their production quantities. We explicitly characterize how the OEM competes with the IR in equilibrium. Specifically, we show that the OEM relies more on quality as a strategic lever when it has a stronger competitive position (determined by the relative cost and value of new and remanufactured products), and in contrast it relies more heavily on limiting quantity of cores when it has a weaker competitive position. The IR's entry threat as well as its successful entry can decrease the consumer surplus. Furthermore, our results illustrate that ignoring the competition or the OEM's quality choice leads to overestimating benefits of remanufacturing for consumer and social welfare. In addition, we show an IR with either a sufficiently weak competitive position (so the OEM deters entry) or a sufficiently strong one (so the OEM is forced to limit quantity of cores) is desirable for reducing the environmental impact. Comparing our results with the benchmark in which the OEM remanufactures suggests that encouraging IRs to remanufacture in lieu of the OEMs may not benefit the environment. Furthermore, the benchmark illustrates that making remanufacturing more attractive improves the environmental impact when the remanufacturer is the OEM, while worsening it when remanufacturing is done by the IR.

Problem definition: In high-product-variety businesses like fashion, mass production (MP) systems create environmental waste in the form of overproduction on a colossal scale. Mass customization (MC) has been proposed—without solid evidence—as a solution. In this paper, we analyze whether MC can indeed offer a win-win solution that helps both the bottom line and the environment. We also study the impact of three real policy options: promoting MC, charging a disposal fee for overproduction, and recycling. Academic/practical relevance: There is increasing interest in mass-customizing fashion goods, not only because consumers value customization, but also because MC is perceived to be environmentally friendly. Our paper puts this advocacy for MC to the test. We contribute to the literature, which has been largely silent on the issue, by uncovering when MC offers a win-win and relating such market outcomes to policy ideas. Methodology: We develop an analytical model of an MP firm adopting MC (going hybrid). The firm’s profit-maximizing variety, price, and inventory decisions then form the basis of our understanding the environmental impact of adopting MC and assessing various policy options. Results: Adopting MC can be a win-win, but it can also increase overproduction and hurt the environment. Our policy analyses reveal two kinds of insights. The first kind is about whether a policy expands win-win outcomes—encouraging sustainable adoption of MC. Among the policy ideas we explore, only promoting MC so as to increase consumers’ tolerance for waiting for mass-customized products can do that unambiguously. The second kind of insight is about whether a policy reduces the hybrid firm’s environmental impact. Only a disposal fee and costly recycling programs can do that unambiguously. Managerial implications: For MC adoption to be a win-win, policy makers must (1) work on convincing consumers to wait for bespoke fashion; (2) target MP firms with low cost of variety (high product-mix flexibility) with disposal fees or costly recycling programs; and (3) encourage those with relatively higher cost of variety to develop/acquire technology that would make recycling profitable. History: This paper has been accepted for the Manufacturing & Service Operations Management Special Section on Responsible Research in Operations Management. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.1088 .