Potential diversification benefits are one reason why US financial holding companies are offering a growing range of financial services. This paper examines whether the observed shift toward activities that generate fees, trading revenue, and other non-interest income has improved the performance of US financial holding companies (FHCs) from 1997 to 2002. We find evidence that diversification benefits exist between FHCs, but these gains are offset by the increased exposure to non-interest activities, which are much more volatile but not necessarily more profitable than interest-generating activities. Within FHCs, however, marginal increases in revenue diversification are not associated with better performance, while marginal increases in non-interest income are still associated with lower risk-adjusted profits. The key finding that diversification gains are more than offset by the costs of increased exposure to volatile activities represents the dark side of the search for diversification benefits and has implications for supervisors, managers, investors, and borrowers.

This paper investigates the equity investments and voting rights that American banks control through their trust business. The paper also studies whether the voting rights American banks control through their trust business help explain their presence on firms’ corporate boards. We find that on average the largest 100 American banks control 10% of the voting rights of S&P 500 firms. We also find that there are several firms in the S&P 500 index in which the top banks control more than 20% of their voting rights, and several firms in the country in which these banks control more than 60% of their voting rights. Our investigation into the presence of American bankers on corporate boards shows that bankers are more likely to join the boards of firms in which they control a large voting stake. We also find that banks’ lending relationships help explain bankers’ board memberships. Our results further show that bankers who have both a voting stake in a firm and a lending relationship with it have a higher likelihood of joining the firm's board of directors.