I examine the impact of mutual fund manager replacement on subsequent fund perfor? mance. Using a sample of 393 domestic equity and bond fund managers that were replaced over the 1979-1991 period, for the underperformers, I document significant improvements in post-replacement performance relative to the past performance of the fund. On the other hand, the replacement of overperforming managers results in deterioration in postreplacement performance. I find evidence supporting the presence of strategic risk shifting in the fund portfolios prior to replacement. Furthermore, consistent with the notion of win? dow dressing, I document that the level of portfolio turnover activity decreases significantly in the post-replacement period. Lastly, the replacement of poor performers is preceded by significant decreases in net new inflows in the fund.

This paper examines the relation between the replacement of mutual fund managers and their prior performance. Using the growth rate in a fund's asset base and its portfolio returns as two separate measures of performance, I document an inverse relation between the probability of managerial replacement and fund performance. The sample of departing fund managers exhibits higher portfolio turnover rates and higher expenses relative to an objective-matched sample of nonreplaced fund managers. The overall evidence is consistent with the presence of well-functioning internal and external market mechanisms for mutual fund managers.

To examine the role of executive compensation in corporate acquisition decisions, we compare executive compensation of firms undertaking large acquisitions to a control sample of non-acquirors. Before the acquisitions, we find a positive relation between firm size and compensation for executives of acquirors; we do not find such a relation for non-acquirors. This result suggests an ex ante expectation that larger firm size will result in larger managerial remuneration. Ex post, however, large acquisitions have a small positive effect on total compensation. When we separate good from bad acquisitions, we find that good acquisitions increase compensation, whereas bad acquisitions do not have a positive effect on compensation.

[For a sample of 1163 mutual funds started over the period 1979-1992, we find that fund initiations are positively related to the level of assets invested in and the capital gains embedded in other funds with the same objective, the fund family's prior performance, the fraction of funds in the family in the low range of fees, and the decision by large families to open similar funds in the prior year. In addition, consistent with the presence of scale and scope economies in fund openings, we find that large families and families that have more experience in opening funds in the past are more likely to open new funds.]

We study 120 rights offerings by closed-end funds from 1988-1998. On average, rights offerings are announced when funds trade at a premium. This premium turns into a discount over the course of the offering. The premium decline is more severe when increases in the investment advisor's compensation are larger and when the fund uses affiliated brokerdealers to solicit subscriptions to the offer. A clinical analysis shows that rights offerings allow investment advisors to sidestep fee rebates and increase pecuniary benefits to affiliated entities. Overall, our results suggest the presence of significant conflicts of interest in rights offerings by closed-end funds.

We study mutual fund mergers between 1999 and 2001 to understand the role and effectiveness of fund boards. Some fund mergers—typically across-family mergers—benefit target shareholders but are costly to target fund directors. Such mergers are more likely when funds underperform and their boards have a larger percentage of independent trustees, suggesting that more-independent boards tolerate less underperformance before initiating across-family mergers. This effect is most pronounced when all of the fund's directors are independent, not the 75% level of independence required by the SEC. Higher-paid target fund boards are less likely to approve across-family mergers that cause substantial reductions in their compensation.

[Using a new database, we study fees charged by 46,580 mutual fund classes offered for sale in 18 countries, which account for about 86% of the world fund industry in 2002. We examine management fees, total expense ratios, and total shareholder costs (including load charges). Fees vary substantially across funds and from country to country. To explain these differences, we consider fund, sponsor, and national characteristics. Fees differ by investment objectives: larger funds and fund complexes charge lower fees; fees are higher for funds distributed in more countries and funds domiciled in certain offshore locations (especially when selling into countries levying higher taxes). Substantial cross-country differences persist even after controlling for these variables. These remaining differences can be explained by a variety of factors, the most robust of which is that fund fees are lower in countries with stronger investor protection.]

This article examines competition and investor behavior in the mutual fund industry for the universe of US mutual funds during 1976–2009. Over this period, industry assets increased by a factor of 200, the number of active fund families quadrupled, and the average market share of a family declined by four-fifths. We find that price competition and product differentiation are both effective strategies in obtaining market share. Families that pass along economies of scale to investors and those that charge lower fees than the competition gain market share, but only if these fees are above average to begin with. Loads and 12b-1 fees, however, have a positive effect on market share, consistent with the use of these types of fees for marketing and distribution. Families that perform better, offer a wider range of products, and start more funds relative to the competition (a measure of innovation) also have a higher market share. Innovation is rewarded more if the new fund is more differentiated from existing offerings. Overall, our evidence suggests that mutual fund families compete effectively along both price and non-price dimensions.

For a sample of 1163 mutual funds started over the period 1979–1992, we find that fund initiations are positively related to the level of assets invested in and the capital gains embedded in other funds with the same objective, the fund family's prior performance, the fraction of funds in the family in the low range of fees, and the decision by large families to open similar funds in the prior year. In addition, consistent with the presence of scale and scope economies in fund openings, we find that large families and families that have more experience in opening funds in the past are more likely to open new funds.

We examine the investment behavior of market participants within different international markets (i.e., US, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan), specifically with regard to their tendency to exhibit herd behavior. We find no evidence of herding on the part of market participants in the US and Hong Kong and partial evidence of herding in Japan. However, for South Korea and Taiwan, the two emerging markets in our sample, we document significant evidence of herding. The results are robust across various size-based portfolios and over time. Furthermore, macroeconomic information rather than firm-specific information tends to have a more significant impact on investor behavior in markets which exhibit herding. In all five markets, the rate of increase in security return dispersion as a function of the aggregate market return is higher in up market, relative to down market days. This is consistent with the directional asymmetry documented by McQueen et al. (1996) (McQueen, G., Pinegar, M.A., Thorley, S., 1996. Journal of Finance 51, 889–919).