Under the laws of most countries, a distinction is made between gains and losses by businesses. Losses that must be “carried forward” are subjept to two penalties: a loss of interest, and expiration. Previous examinations have focused on the higher expected tax payments such a tax system without “full loss offset” imposes on risky projects. This paper presents a dynamic analysis of the impact of taxation on investment when gains and losses are treated asymmetrically. The results demonstrate how firm characteristics and the timing of taxes can influence behaviour.

I. Introduction, 589.—II. The model, 590.—III. The controlled economy, 592.—IV. Competitive behavior, 593.—V. Optimal factor taxation, 596.—VI. The nature of optimal taxes, 602.—VII. Optimal capital taxation, 605.—VIII. Bequests and the discount rate, 609.—IX. Conclusion, 610.

I. Introduction, 433.—II. The model, 434.—III. The problem, 435.—IV. Wealth maximization: no personal taxes, 436.—V. Wealth maximization with personal taxes, 438.—VI. Firm value and the cost of capital, 440.—VII. Financial policy and the cost of capital, 442.—VIII. Conclusion, 445.

AEJ Policy will publish papers covering a range of topics, the common theme being the role of economic policy in economic outcomes. Subject areas will include public economics; urban and regional economics; public policy aspects of health, education, welfare, and political institutions; law and economics; economic regulation; and environmental and natural resource economics.