The authors analyze the evolution of duopolists' prices and market shares in an infinite-period market with consumer switching costs in which in every period new consumers arrive and a fraction of old consumers leaves. They show prices (and profits) are higher than without switching costs and that this result does not depend importantly on their specific assumptions. The authors show switching costs make the market more attractive to a new entrant, even though an entrant must overcome the disadvantage that a large fraction of the market is already committed to the incumbent's product. They also examine the effects of market growth.

This paper shows that the price of a painting sold at an art auction and the experts' pre-sale valuations are anchored on the price at which the painting previously sold at auction. We are able to separate anchoring from rational learning by using the identifying strategy that the unobservable component of quality for a particular painting remains constant between the last auction sale and the current auction sale. We interpret these results as anchoring on the part of the buyers, with the sellers and auctioneers either anticipating anchoring on the part of the buyers or exhibiting anchoring effects themselves.