Using data on Internet news reading, we measure fund‐level attention to both aggregate and firm‐specific news and relate it to fund portfolio allocation decisions. In the time series, we find that funds shift attention toward macroeconomic news during periods of high aggregate volatility. Those funds that exhibit stronger attention‐reallocation patterns earn higher future returns. In the cross‐section of fund portfolios, fund attention is positively related to stock holdings. Furthermore, fund attention to a stock increases the value‐add of that position to the fund's performance. This relationship is stronger using fund attention to more value‐relevant news articles.

Compliance-driven investments in technology—or “RegTech”—are growing rapidly. To understand the effects on the financial sector, we study firms’ responses to new internal control requirements. Affected firms make significant investments in ERP and hardware. These expenditures then enable complementary investments that are leveraged for noncompliance purposes, leading to modest savings from avoided customer complaints and misconduct. IT budgets rise and profits fall, especially at small firms, and acquisition activity and market concentration increase. Our results illustrate how regulation can directly and indirectly affect technology adoption, which in turn affects noncompliance functions and market structure.

Banks’ information technology (IT) capabilities affect their ability to serve customers during the COVID-19 pandemic, which generates an unexpected and unprecedented shock that shifts banking services from in-person to digital. Amid mobility restrictions, banks with better IT experience larger reductions in physical branch visits and larger increases in website traffic, implying a larger shift to digital banking. Stronger IT banks are able to originate more Paycheck Protection Program loans to small business borrowers, especially in areas with more severe COVID-19 outbreaks, higher internet use, and higher bank competition. Those banks also attract more deposit flows and receive better mobile customer reviews during the pandemic.

The Dodd-Frank Act shifted regulatory jurisdiction over “ midsize” investment advisers from the SEC to state-securities regulators. Client complaints against midsize advisers increased relative to those continuing under SEC oversight by 30 to 40 percent of the unconditional probability. Complaints increasingly cited fiduciary violations and rose more where state regulators had fewer resources. Advisers responding more to weaker oversight had past complaints, were located farther from regulators, faced less competition, had more conflicts of interest, and served primarily less-sophisticated clients. Our results inform optimal regulatory design in markets with informational asymmetries and search frictions.

In canonical models of investment dynamics under uncertainty, “time-to-build” in investment decisions implies that uncertainty negatively impacts firm values and aggregate capital productivity. However, capital budgeting, which involves ex-ante information acquisition and state-contingent investment decisions, can potentially ameliorate time-to-build frictions. Reduced-form evidence using firm-level data on sales and investment expectations and errors supports both mechanisms. Incorporating capital budgeting into a standard investment model, our calibrated model reveals that state-contingent investment planning and information acquisition reduce aggregate productivity losses by 41% and 17%, respectively. Moreover, gains from planning accrue primarily to less productive firms, while information acquisition benefits higher productivity ones.