Using a proprietary, hand-collected database of 251 sanctions issued by national and international authorities on 109 European banks, we investigate the deterrent effect of governance effectiveness at the country level on detected bank misconduct from 2009 to 2019. We also examine the impact of detected bank misconduct on depositor behavior to investigate how customer reaction is shaped by media coverage. Our empirical strategy based on probit and panel fixed effects shows the existence of a deterrent effect exerted by country governance effectiveness. Moreover, the instrumental regressions show that depositors react to detected bank misconduct by withdrawing their funds and that this reaction is stronger when news coverage is high.

A poor risk culture was one of the causes of the financial crisis. Surprisingly, there is no evidence of the link between risk culture and bank stability. Using a large sample of European banks from 2004 to 2017, our paper shows that a sound risk culture leads to better performance. Our research design is based on three steps. First, we developed a new Sound Risk Culture Indicator based on the Financial Stability Board (2014) risk culture framework. Second, we estimated this new metric by applying Quantitative Text Analysis. Third, we used an IV 2SLS panel data approach to establish a causal link between bank risk culture and profitability.

With the establishment of an integrated Banking Union, the harmonization of supervisory styles (regulation being equal) plays a central role. Our paper addresses a central question: what supervisory culture has been demonstrated to be most effective at ensuring the stability of European banks? We identify six different supervisory cultures and observe to what extent the words used in public speeches by the deans of the national supervision authority reflect the national cultural values of the Hofstede framework (Hofstede et al., 2010). By analyzing a panel of banks operating in the EU-15 from 1999 and 2011, our paper provides empirical evidence that supervisory culture influences the stability of banks. Our results have important policy implications: our paper is the first to provide empirical evidence of heterogeneity in the supervision styles in Europe and its effect on banking stability.