One of the virtues of parameter preference models (presented in general form in Rubinstein [23]) is their empirical content. Applied models of financial theory rely heavily on the mean variance (MV) version of parameter preference. As spelled out in Samuelson [25], MV models are adequate with compact distributions of returns and when portfolio decisions are made frequently so that the risk parameter becomes sufficiently small.

We examine delivery systems that disseminate market timing information either through newsletters or by setting up timing funds in which investors can invest. Absent market imperfections, both systems produce the same result. With restrictions on borrowing, or with other nonlinearities, the newletter system is superior. This result does not depend on the cost of obtaining information or uncertainty about, or the manipulation of, the quality of the information. Institutional restrictions on borrowing, and preferences that lead to nonlinear responses to information signals, provide one explanation for the plethora of market timing newsletters and the paucity of market timing funds.

Previous investigators have shown that the Sharpe measure of the performance of a managed portfolio may be flawed when the portfolio manager has market timing ability. Herein we develop the exact conditions under which the Sharpe measure will completely and correctly order market timers according to ability. The derived conditions are necessary, sufficient, and observable. We compare these derived conditions to empirical estimates of actual market conditions and find that, under typical market conditions, the practice of using quarterly portfolio return data will frequently result in a failure of the Sharpe measure to order timers according to ability. We show, however, that such failures can be greatly reduced by more frequent sampling of managed portfolio returns.

A number of futures contracts conveys to the short position various delivery options regarding the quality and exact timing of delivery. Moreover, the compensation to the long position is not solely determined by the market value of the delivered asset at the time of delivery. Sometimes, the long position can hedge this delivery risk by holding an appropriate portfolio of the underlying asset. It often has been stated that whenever the long position can form a dynamic hedge against the delivery risk, the delivery option has a zero value. This paper demonstrates the implication of such erroneous intuition to the pricing of options. It is shown that the root of the issue is the property of diffusion processes whereas, within a given time interval, a random variable either will never cross a given boundary or else, cross it an infinite number of times.

The Chicago Board of Trade Treasury Bond Futures Contract allows the short position several delivery options as to when and with which bond the contract will be settled. The timing option allows the short position to choose any business day in the delivery month to make delivery. In addition, the contract settlement price is locked in at 2:00 p.m. when the futures market closes, despite the facts that the short position need not declare an intent to settle the contract until 8:00 p.m. and that trading in Treasury bonds can occur all day in dealer markets. If bond prices change significantly between 2:00 and 8:00 p.m., the short has the option of settling the contract at a favorable 2:00 p.m. price. This phenomenon, which recurs on every trading day of the delivery month, creates a sequence of 6-hour put options for the short position which has been dubbed the “wild card option.” This paper presents a valuation model for the wild card option and computes estimates of the value of that option, as well as rules for its optimal exercise.

The Chicago Board of Trade Treasury Bond Futures Contract allows the short position several delivery options as to when and with which bond the contract will be settled. The timing option allows the short position to choose any business day in the delivery month to make delivery. In addition, the contract settlement price is locked in at 2:00 p . m . when the futures market closes, despite the facts that the short position need not declare an intent to settle the contract until 8:00 p . m . and that trading in Treasury bonds can occur all day in dealer markets. If bond prices change significantly between 2:00 and 8:00 p . m ., the short has the option of settling the contract at a favorable 2:00 p . m . price. This phenomenon, which recurs on every trading day of the delivery month, creates a sequence of 6‐hour put options for the short position which has been dubbed the “wild card option.” This paper presents a valuation model for the wild card option and computes estimates of the value of that option, as well as rules for its optimal exercise.

Equilibrium in the market for real assets requires that the price of those assets be bid up to reflect the tax shields they can offer to levered firms.Thus there must be an equality between the market values of real assets and the values of optimally levered firms.The standard measure of the advantage to leverage compares the values of levered and unlevered assets, and can be misleading and difficult to interpret.We show that a meaningful measure of the advantage to debt is the extra rate of return, net of a market premium for bankruptcy risk, earned by a levered firm relative to an otherwise-identical unlevered firm.We construct an option valuation model to calculate such a measure and present extensive simulation results.We use this model to compute optimal debt maturities, show how this approach can be used for capital budgeting, and discuss its implications for the comparison of bankruptcy costs versus tax shields.

We examine abnormal stock returns surrounding contemporaneous earnings and dividend announcements in order to determine whether investors evaluate the two announcements in relation to each other. We find that there is a statistically significant interaction effect. The abnormal return corresponding to any earnings or dividend announcement depends upon the value of the other announcement. This evidence suggests the existence of a corroborative relationship between the two announcements. Investors give more credence to unanticipated dividend increases or decreases when earnings are also above or below expectations, and vice versa.