This paper investigates share price reactions and corporate responses to a set of policy changes regarding binding say-on-pay in Switzerland. The cross-section of stock price reactions indicates a trade-off: On the one hand, binding votes on executive compensation amounts, especially when conducted retrospectively, can help reduce agency costs by enhancing the alignment of management and shareholder interests. On the other hand, retrospective binding votes entail costs, for example, by distorting executives’ incentives for extracontractual, firm-specific investments. Corporate responses to the policy changes also reflect these trade-offs. Overall, our findings suggest that stronger and more direct shareholder power may not always be in the best interests of the shareholders themselves.

Mergers and acquisitions are often motivated by an intention to create value from intangible assets. We develop a word list of intangibles and apply it to takeover announcements. One standard deviation more in intangible-related language (“intangibles talk”) lowers announcement returns for the acquirer by 0.53 percentage points and predicts worse operating performance. Bidder managers appear to believe in the deals nonetheless, as evidenced by insider trades, payment choices, and completion probabilities and speed. Overall, takeover announcement texts reveal important information about hard-to-measure aspects of deal quality.

Following the 2023–2024 Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) capital-efficiency initiative, investors favored low price-to-book (PBR) firms, particularly those with high return on equity (ROE). These effects are concentrated among persistently undervalued firms, increase smoothly with the degree of undervaluation rather than jumping at the regulatory threshold, and are robust to endogenous treatment assignment. Although firms’ value-enhancing plans were already publicly available in corporate governance reports, the TSE’s consolidated compliance list triggered strong market reactions, consistent with a salient informational event. We find no short-run improvements in realized profitability or upward revisions in analyst earnings forecasts, but significant declines in illiquidity and increases in valuation ratios among low-PBR firms. We also find little evidence of a persistent “price-of-shame” mechanism or strong industry-level spillovers, although spillovers through non-industry links cannot be fully ruled out. Overall, the evidence suggests that the reform primarily triggered investor-side repricing of chronic undervaluation rather than immediate changes in firm behavior.

We survey portfolio companies of a large asset owner to explore the evolving landscape of nature risks. Nearly half of all companies (48 percent) view nature risks as financially material, and 43 percent of those perceive nature-related physical risks, and 27 percent transition risks, as having financial effects already today. Three-quarters of companies experiencing nature-related investor engagement view these interactions as value-generating. Nonetheless, according to the respondents, investor attention remains limited in key respects: while 40 percent report that investors consider nature risks, fewer than 25 percent believe investors assess how these risks affect cashflows or costs of capital. Half of the respondents believe investors will prioritize climate over nature; however, many think both topics are so intertwined that they cannot be separated. Our findings underscore the growing recognition of nature risks as financially relevant, while also pointing to challenges and opportunities for their integration into financial analysis and investor engagement.