We estimate probabilities of bankruptcy for 5784 industrial firms in the period 1988–2002 in a model where common equity is viewed as a down-and-out barrier option on the firm's assets. Asset values and volatilities as well as firm-specific bankruptcy barriers are simultaneously backed out from the prices of traded equity. Implied barriers are significantly positive and monotonic in the firm's leverage and asset volatility. Our default probabilities display better calibration and discriminatory power than the ones inferred in a standard Black and Scholes [Black, F., Scholes, M., 1973. The pricing of options and corporate liabilities. J. Pol. Econ. 81, 637–659]/Merton [Merton, R.C., 1974. On the pricing of corporate debt: the risk structure of interest rates. J. Finance 29, 449–470] and KMV frameworks. However, accounting-based measures such as Altman Z- and Z″-scores outperform structural models in 1-year-ahead bankruptcy predictions, but lose relevance as the forecast horizon is extended.

In this paper, we study how risk-shifting incentives and the design of debt covenants are affected by the pattern of temporal resolution of uncertainty (TRU) in the underlying technology of the firm. We show that the extent of risk-shifting as well as the yield demanded on corporate debt are larger the later the resolution of uncertainty (thus providing one explanation for the empirical evidence of Reisz and Perlich (2006)). We allow for contracting based on verifiable information disclosed by the manager. In this context, we characterize optimal covenants restricting investment. The effects of these covenants on the firm's investment policy and corporate bond yields under different disclosure policies and patterns of TRU are studied. Empirical implications are derived and discussed.