This paper examines how information asymmetry affects cross-border strategic alliance formation by US firms over the period 2000–2008. We construct a measure, information costs, based on both geographical distance and the proportion of worldwide GDP the partner’s home country represents. Consistent with our expectations, we find an inverse association between information costs and cross-border strategic alliances. When considering the proportion of alliances formed with publicly quoted overseas partners, we find this is unaffected by the level of information costs but rather the level of stock market development, tax rate and general economic conditions. Information costs are, however, significantly negatively related to alliances with overseas private organizations. Our results offer clear support for the on-going importance of information asymmetry in corporate decision making.

We investigate the impact of corporate life cycle on takeover activity from the perspective of acquiring firms. Using the earned/contributed capital mix as the proxy for firm life cycle, we find a highly significant and positive relation between firm life cycle and the likelihood of becoming a bidder. This finding is, however, driven by the mature rather than the old acquirers in the sample. Further we find that, whilst firm life cycle has a positive effect on the probability that a deal will be negotiated, it is negatively related to tender offers. In addition, the likelihood of making both cash and mixed deals are positively related to the corporate life cycle. Finally, we find that life cycle has a negative impact on the abnormal returns generated on the announcement of a deal although it is unable to distinguish between the returns received by firms at different stages in their life cycle.

We examine how an M&A advisor’s position in the network of investment banks affects its ability to create value for acquirers in takeover transactions. We show that acquirers enlisting the services of more centrally positioned M&A advisors enjoy higher announcement abnormal returns and pay lower takeover premiums. Consistent with the idea that central network positions convey an information advantage, we find that the effects are stronger for acquirers facing greater target information asymmetry and for M&A advisors depending more on networks for target-specific information. The information advantage primarily comes from network contacts that had previously assisted the targets in equity issuance. Centrally positioned advisors charge premium fees; network banks appear to enjoy a significant advantage in the competition for future co-advisory appointments.

This paper examines takeover and divestiture activity at the industry level for the population of UK firms over the period 1986–2000. Consistent with US research, takeovers in the UK cluster both across industries and over time. The evidence for divestitures indicates clustering across industries only. The paper further investigates whether broad and specific industry shocks (e.g., growth, free cash flow, concentration, deregulation, foreign competition, technology, stock market performance) explain takeover and divestiture clustering at the industry level. The results suggest that broad shocks increase (decrease) the likelihood of takeovers (divestitures), although not significantly for takeovers. Specific industry shocks that increase the likelihood of takeover activity include low growth, the threat of foreign competition and high stock market performance. For divestitures, high industry concentration and deregulation increase activity. Little evidence is found for deregulation as a significant factor in explaining takeover activity.

We examine executive turnover following environmental, antitrust, intellectual property (IP), and contractual lawsuits filed against their companies. We find that companies' responses to lawsuits depend on the nature of the allegations. In particular, contractual lawsuits are followed by increased turnover of CEOs and inside directors, whereas following environmental and IP lawsuits, only outside directors tend to depart. Antitrust lawsuits are followed by increased appointments of inside directors. We also find that lawsuit merit and pecuniary demands for damages play a role in determining executive turnover. In addition, we find some evidence of reduced CEO compensation following lawsuits. Overall, we provide insights into the effectiveness of the executive labor market in responding to alleged corporate wrongdoing.

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We investigate the impact of cyberattacks on a firm's equity issuance decisions. Our findings indicate that firms targeted by cyberattacks are less likely to pursue seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) afterward. This effect is more pronounced when the target firm has lower external financing needs and operates in a poor information environment. This result remains robust after addressing sample selection bias through propensity score matching and entropy balancing approaches. We attribute this reduction in SEO activities to reputation loss, investors' adverse selection, and the resulting higher equity financing costs. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the negative impact of cyberattacks on SEOs extends to industry peers. This spillover effect is stronger when the target firm suffers significant reputation loss, when the stock prices of peers closely correlate with those of the target firm, when peer firms possess a higher ex-ante cyber risk, and when they are more vulnerable to future cyberattacks.

We examine whether analysts' forecast properties deter inefficient labor investment decisions. Using accuracy and dispersion as analysts' forecast properties, we find that more accurate and less dispersed forecasts are associated with less inefficient corporate labor investments. Utilizing Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) as an exogenous variation to analysts' forecast activities, we find a causal relationship between analysts' forecast properties and labor investment inefficiency. We also find that more accurate and less dispersed forecasts decrease labor cost stickiness. Our results are consistent with the view that analysts' forecast properties enhance the information environment, which, in turn, improves corporate labor investment decisions.

We examine the impact of CEO-director ties on labor investment efficiency. Using an aggregate measure of CEO-director ties we find that CEOs who have strong ties with independent board members are associated with inefficient labor investment. The effect is stronger in firms that rely more on skilled labor and those that are financially constrained, and that inefficient labor investment exacerbates labor cost stickiness. Our results are robust to selection bias, endogeneity concerns, and alternative explanations. Overall, the results are consistent with the view that stronger CEO ties to independent board members makes monitoring ineffective, which, in turn, aggravates the inefficient labor investment problem. Thus, we identify a potential channel through which CEO-director ties can be detrimental to shareholder value.

Firm fixed effects alone explain as much of the variation in acquirer returns as all the firm- and deal-specific characteristics combined. An interquartile range of acquirer fixed effects is over 6%, comparable to the interquartile range of acquirer returns. Acquirer returns persist over time, but mainly at the top end of the distribution. Persistence continues under different chief executive officers (CEOs), and attributes of the broader management team do not explain the fixed effect. Firm-specific heterogeneity in acquirer returns suggests that some organizations are extraordinary acquirers irrespective of the leadership at the top and the deal structures they choose. Implications for the M&A research are discussed.