Asset securitization offers banks the possibility of altering their capital structures and the financial intermediation process. This study shows that the introduction of securitization is associated with fundamental changes in the funding policies of banks. We present evidence of more intense use of securitization by banks with stronger growth opportunities, liquidity constraints, costlier alternative sources of funding, and restricted access to capital markets due to adverse selection. Securitization is observed to be higher in the pecking order of financing choices of small- and medium-sized banks and nonlisted banks, which are likely to face more severe adverse selection problems. (JEL G32, G21) 1.

This paper examines the contribution of investments in Information Technology (IT) and in advertising to the output and profits of Spanish banks, in the period 1983–2003. We find that the growth in the stock of IT capital explains one third of output growth of banks, and that an additional investment in IT of one million euros may be substituted for twenty-five workers. The paper also finds that advertising investments increase the demand for bank services with an elasticity of 0.22 for deposits and 0.11 for loans. For all the assets considered, the null hypothesis that banks use the profit-maximizing amount of services per period cannot be rejected with the data.

The high levels of operating efficiency, profits, and market values for banks in the years before the financial crisis raise reasonable doubts about the accuracy of the assessments of the efficiency of banking intermediation. We examine the productivity growth in Spanish banks in the pre-crisis period by separating out the contributions to productivity growth from business practices and from industry-wide technological progress. We find that more than two thirds of the estimated productivity growth in the years 2000–2007 is attributed to banks’ practices, such as the expansion of credit in the housing market, the high recourse to securitization and short-term finance, the reduction in liquidity holdings, and the leveraging process of banks’ balance sheets, that the literature claims are the ultimate causes of the crisis. We estimate that the remaining cumulative annual growth rate is 2.8% for the industry’s technical progress, which is similar to that in the period of 1992–2000.

Ownership, governance, and institutional diversity among banks are a subject of public and regulatory concern. This paper addresses this issue by using a case study of Spain, where the retail banking market was split evenly between shareholder and stakeholder banks before the crisis. We examine how institutional diversity mattered in the accumulation of risk in the pre-crisis years, in the severity of losses caused by the crisis, and in the resilience to recover from the losses. The method of analysis consists in linking the risk position of the banks in the pre-crisis period and the losses arising during the crisis to the decisions of banks to migrate from business models based on deposit financing to models based on market-debt financing. We find that cajas migrated to more vulnerable business models following the strategy of the shareholder banks, but the losses in the crisis were much higher in the former than in the latter. The paper interprets this result as evidence that what matters the most about the ownership of banks is their resilience in bad times.

This paper investigates the impact of loan renegotiations on firms’ credit risk using the CDS market as a measure of credit risk. Using a sample of public US firms for 2010–2017, we document a significant decrease in CDS spreads and returns that we interpret as evidence of a certification effect. The finding suggests that the loan renegotiations are on average beneficial for the firm. The strongest reactions are for material amendments such as line of credit amount or tranche amount. Additionally, we find negative stock market returns, although barely statistically significant. Moreover, we identify an anticipation effect of up to 30 days before the announcement date on the CDS market, possibly due to informed trading by CDS banks of their speculative-rated borrowers’ CDS contracts. Finally, we show that firm-specific CDS returns lead idiosyncratic stock returns, especially around the announcement date and for speculative-rated firms.