This paper investigates the effect of international swap lines on stock returns using data from banks in emerging markets. The analysis first shows that swap lines by the Swiss National Bank (SNB) had a positive impact on bank stocks in Central and Eastern Europe. It then highlights the importance of individual bank characteristics in identifying the asymmetric effect of swap lines on bank stocks. Bank-level evidence suggests that stock prices of local and less-well capitalized banks as well as banks with high foreign currency exposures and high reliance on short-term funding responded more strongly to SNB swap lines. This new evidence is consistent with the view that swap lines not only enhanced market liquidity but also reduced risks associated with micro-prudential issues.

This paper investigates the effect of international swap lines on stock returns using data from banks in emerging markets. The analysis first shows that swap lines by the Swiss National Bank (SNB) had a positive impact on bank stocks in Central and Eastern Europe. It then highlights the importance of individual bank characteristics in identifying the asymmetric effect of swap lines on bank stocks. Bank-level evidence suggests that stock prices of local and less-well capitalized banks as well as banks with high foreign currency exposures and high reliance on short-term funding responded more strongly to SNB swap lines. This new evidence is consistent with the view that swap lines not only enhanced market liquidity but also reduced risks associated with micro-prudential issues.

We examine the association between country-level sectoral credit dynamics and bank-level systemic risk. Contrary to most studies that only delve into broad-based credit development, we focus on sectoral credit allocation, specifically to households versus firms, and to the tradable versus non-tradable sector. Based on a global sample of 417 banks across 46 countries over the period 2000-2014, we find that lending to households and corporates in the non-tradable sector is positively associated with system-wide distress. Conversely, credit granted to corporations and to the tradable sector negatively correlates with banks’ systemic behavior. Sub-sample analysis shows that risks from household lending are transmitted through small banks, whereas non-tradable lending is transmitted through large banks. Moreover, banks located in emerging market and developing economies exhibit enhanced systemic behavior against the backdrop of higher household and tradable credit growth, whereas credit to non-tradable sector firms tends to increase systemic fragility of banks in advanced economies. By the same token, the results differ for the pre-crisis and crisis/post-crisis periods, with the full sample findings driven by the crisis/post-crisis timespan. The findings emphasize critical policy implications considering sectoral heterogeneity, bank size, country of incorporation of banks, and periods of financial tranquillity/instability. Authorities can intervene in the most systemic economic sectors and limit the accumulation of “bad credit” and preserve systemic resilience, while still benefiting from the positive impact of “good credit” on growth and financial stability.

External imbalances played a pivotal role leading to the global financial crisis and were an important cause of turmoil. While current account (flow) imbalances narrowed in the aftermath of the crisis, the net international investment position (NIIP) (stock) imbalances persisted. This study explores the implications of countries’ net foreign positions on systemic risk. Using a sample of 470 banks located in 49 advanced economies, emerging countries, and developing economies over 2000–2020, we find robust empirical evidence that banks can reduce their systemic risk exposure when the countries in which they are incorporated improve their NIIPs and maintain creditor status vis-à-vis the rest of the world. However, only the equity component of the NIIP is responsible for this outcome, whereas debt flows are not significant. Similarly, we find that the mitigating effect of an external balance sheet on systemic risk is derived from valuation gains rather than from the incremental net acquisition of assets or liabilities represented by the current account. Our findings are particularly relevant for policymakers seeking to improve banks’ resilience to adverse shocks and maintain financial stability.

In this paper, we gauge the degree of interconnectedness and quantify the linkages between global and other systemically important institutions, and the global financial system. We document that the two groups and the financial system become more interconnected during the global financial crisis when linkages across groups grow. In contrast, during tranquil times linkages within groups prevail. Global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) contribute most to system-wide distress but are also most exposed. There are more links coming from G-SIBs to other systemically important institutions (O-SIIs) than the other way around, confirming the role of G-SIBs as major risk transmitters in the financial system. The two groups and the global financial system tend to co-vary for periods up to 60 days Prior to their official designation as G-SIBs or O-SIIs, the prevalent news sentiment about these institutions (we measure with a textual analysis) was negative. Importantly, the systemic importance and exposure of G-SIBs and O-SIIs is perceived differently by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the European Banking Authority (EBA).

How have financial markets reacted to the disclosure of the list of Other Systemically Important Institutions by the European Banking Authority? With an event study of bank stock prices, we document that the immediate reaction of the stock market is negative, suggesting that the included financial institutions are perceived to be less profitable because they are subject to tighter regulation. However, within a few days, investors change their perception in the case of both euro-zone and noneuro-zone banks, which can be attributed to their too-big-to-fail status. CDS spreads react similarly, increasing first before decreasing almost immediately thereafter. On the day of the event, abnormal returns are more negative for banks selected using supervisory judgement and for large banks. In the long run, the market reacts more positively in the case of financial institutions selected using discretionary information and those with a lower capitalization. (143 words)