This paper examines the historical effects of the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) cycle on world prices and economic activity. The primary focus is on world real non-oil primary commodity prices, although the effects on G-7 consumer price inflation and GDP growth are also considered. This paper has several distinct advantages over previous studies. First, several econometric models are estimated using fairly broad measures of prices and economic activity. Second, the models include continuous measures of ENSO intensity (sea surface temperature and sea-level air pressure anomalies in the Pacific Ocean) rather than dummy variable measures. Finally, confidence intervals are constructed for all estimated effects of ENSO on world prices and economic activity. The analysis indicates that ENSO has economically important and statistically significant effects on world real commodity prices. A one-standard-deviation positive surprise in ENSO, for example, raises real commodity price inflation about 3.5 to 4 percentage points. Moreover, ENSO appears to account for almost 20% of commodity price inflation movements over the past several years. ENSO also has some explanatory power for world consumer price inflation and world economic activity, accounting for approximately 10% to 20% of movements in those variables.

There is now a substantial body of evidence that suggests business cycles are asymmetric. However, the evidence has been accumulated using a wide array of statistical techniques and, consequently, is based on various definitions of asymmetry. This paper examines several parametric models that have been used to study asymmetries in real GNP. Although these models capture asymmetries in very different ways, their dynamic properties are remarkably similar.

In late 1990, the Federal Reserve eliminated reserve requirements on nonpersonal time deposits, and required reserves fell by about $10 billion, an almost 20-percent reduction. In early 1992, reserve requirements against transaction accounts were lowered from 12 percent to 10 percent, releasing an additional $3.5 billion of required reserves.1 These reductions, by lowering total reserve balances, potentially could increase reserve market volatility, impeding the implementation of monetary policy and possibly spilling over into other markets. This paper examines the effects of reserve requirements on market volatility and on the central bank's ability to achieve shortrun policy objectives. Although a number of earlier studies have examined the effects of reserve requirements on the effectiveness of monetary policy, our approach differs in two important respects. First, we focus on the ability to achieve short-run objectives. Second, we provide empirical estimates of the likely effects of lower reserve requirements. The central bank cannot directly achieve its long-run objectives of output and price stability, so it uses policy rules to set shortand intermediate-run targets for certain economic variables, such as interest rates or monetary aggregates, consistent with its long-term goals.2 The central bank cannot, however, perfectly control shortor intermediate-run targets, so it also relies on a set of operational rules. Operational rules are used to set instruments (such as reserve requirements, the discount rate, and openmarket operations) in order to achieve the shorter-run targets. Previous studies, such as Ira Kaminow (1977), Jeremy Siegel (1981), Ernst Baltensperger (1982), Richard T. Froyen and Kenneth J. Kopecky (1983), and Brian R. Horrigan (1988), focused exclusively on longer-term objectives of monetary policy. In contrast, we focus on the shortterm goals of monetary policy. In addition, we provide empirical estimates of the impact that changes in reserve requirements are likely to have on volatility in the money market. Previous studies were largely theoretical and, therefore, could only show that the impact of a change in policy depended on various unknown parameters of a particular model.