We show that U.S. firms cut imports by 31.8% when their international suppliers experience environmental and social (E&S) incidents. These trade cuts are larger for publicly listed U.S. importers facing high E&S investor pressure and lead to cross-country supplier reallocation, suggesting that E&S preferences in capital markets can be privately costly but have real effects for foreign suppliers. Larger trade cuts around the incident result in better supplier E&S performance in subsequent years and in the eventual resumption of trade. Our results highlight the role of investors in ensuring suppliers’ E&S compliance along global supply chains.

We study how lenders in blockheld firms exploit the information on the other holdings of equity blockholders to learn their attitude toward creditors. In the presence of the conflict of interest between lenders and equityholders, information on how blockholders behave in the other firms they control provides the lenders with key information about potential blockholder behavior. We test this hypothesis using data on US public firms over the 2001–2008 period. We show that the financial conditions of these co-owned firms affect how lenders value other firms in which the owner has a major stake. Bad news on credit quality in co-owned firms raise the firm's credit risk. Our identification is based on the instrumental variables estimation where we instrument the changes in credit risk of co-owned firms by the natural disaster events in the counties of co-owned firm headquarters.

We consider the case of changing competition that comes from stronger antitrust enforcement around the world to show that, as the equilibrium switches from collusion to oligopolistic competition, firms step up investment and increase equity issuance. As a result, debt ratios fall. These results imply the importance of financial flexibility in surviving competitive threats. Our identification relies on a difference-in-differences estimation based on the staggered passage of leniency programs in 63 countries around the world from 1990 to 2012. Received December 12, 2016; editorial decision July 10, 2018 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.

We empirically study how collusion in product markets affects firms' financial disclosure strategies. We find that after a rise in cartel enforcement, U.S. firms start sharing more detailed information in their financial disclosure about their customers, contracts, and products. This new information potentially benefits peers by helping to tacitly coordinate actions in product markets. Indeed, changes in disclosure are associated with higher future profitability. Our results highlight the potential conflict between securities and antitrust regulations.

We examine how executive compensation can be designed to facilitate product market collusion. We look at the 2013 decision to close several regional offices of the U.S. Department of Justice, which lowered antitrust enforcement for firms located near these closed offices. We argue this made collusion more appealing to shareholders, and find that these firms increased the sensitivity of executive pay to local rivals' performance, consistent with rewarding the managers for colluding with them. The affected CEOs were also granted longer vesting periods, which provides long-term incentives that could foster collusive arrangements.

We exploit staggered changes in state-level corporate tax rates to show that an increase in taxes reduces future innovation. A variety of tests, including those based on policy discontinuity at contiguous counties straddling borders of politically similar states, show that local economic conditions do not drive our results. The effect we document is consistent across the innovation spectrum: taxes affect not only patenting and R&D investment but also new product introductions, which we measure using textual analysis. Our empirical results are consistent with models that highlight the role of higher corporate taxes in reducing innovator incentives and discouraging risk-taking.

We present evidence that banking development plays a key role in technological progress. We focus on manufacturing firms' innovative performance, measured by patent-based metrics, and employ exogenous variations in banking development arising from the staggered deregulation of banking activities across US states during the 1980s and 1990s. We find that interstate banking deregulation had significant beneficial effects on the quantity and quality of innovation activities, especially for firms highly dependent on external capital and located closer to entering banks. Furthermore, we find that these results are strongly driven by a greater ability of deregulated banks to geographically diversify credit risk.