We explain why the market underreacts to the certified extreme financial distress signal conveyed by the auditor's going-concern (GC) opinion. We conjecture that GC stocks attract retail investors with gambling proclivities. Splitting our GC sample into lottery-like and non-lottery-like firms, we find that the anomaly is concentrated in lottery-like firms, which underperform by −17 % to −32 % over the following year. A range of analyses confirm retail investors with greater propensity to gamble are more likely to trade lottery-like GC stocks. We conclude that retail investor gambling-motivated trading behavior is a key driver of the going-concern market paradox.

We study the aggregate impact of information spillovers emerging from industry star firms. Changes in stars’ relative earnings growth predict future earnings growth, consensus earnings surprises, and job postings of same-industry nonstar firms. Star-firm performance also predicts industry-level GDP and employment growth. Price markup and innovation spillovers are potential channels underlying these patterns. Our results further show that this performance predictability is not fully incorporated into nonstars’ stock prices. A long–short portfolio based on star firms’ earnings growth earns an annualized 6-factor alpha of 8.7%. Together, our findings provide consistent evidence of the economic importance of star firms.