Auditing standards vary in their degree of prescriptive language—for example, stating that auditors “could” versus “should” do certain procedures. We posit that more prescriptive language primes an implemental mindset, thereby creating a feeling of regulatory fit with objective verification tasks and improving auditors' performance on these tasks. In an experiment with audit students, we find that participants who apply a more (versus less) prescriptive auditing standard perform better on a subsequent, unrelated ticking-and-tying task, and this effect is larger for participants who identify less with the audit profession. Theory-consistent evidence indicates that the interaction of regulatory fit and professional identity improves performance via increased motivation. Our study provides evidence that features of the audit environment prime mindsets, that these primed mindsets can affect performance on low-level tasks, and that the effect of regulatory fit for low-level tasks is particularly important for those who identify less with the audit profession.

We examine how disclosure delivery mode—oral versus written—influences investors' reactions to managers' tone language. We hypothesize that listening to disclosures, relative to reading them, causes managers' qualitative word choices to have a greater impact on investors' judgments. We theorize that this effect occurs because oral delivery mode promotes heuristic processing and qualitative tone language is an easy‐to‐process disclosure element. The results from an experiment in a conference call setting are consistent with our hypothesis and suggest a boundary condition. Specifically, the interaction of mode and tone language is significant in a setting where heuristic processing is likely (good earnings news) but not in a setting where investors are likely to scrutinize the disclosure (bad earnings news). Our results inform investors about the potential consequences of how they consume disclosures. Specifically, we show that investors are more susceptible to managers' tone language when listening to disclosures containing good news than when reading them.

This study conducts two experiments to examine how investors’ judgments differ when they read a press release using either a mobile device or a computer. Results show that when investors use a mobile device, information related to a specific headline (mentioning a specific part of the news like “net income” or “revenue”) influences their investment judgments more than when investors use a computer. This effect is robust to specific headlines that focus on either positive or negative information. In contrast, investors’ judgments do not differ when they use a mobile device compared to a computer and the headline is general (using the broad term “results”). We replicate our findings in a second experiment and provide evidence that the observed effect occurs because investors who use their mobile device are in a more distracted frame of mind, which in turn increases the influence of prominent information. Our results suggest that managers’ presentation choices may have a greater influence on investors as they increasingly rely on mobile devices to research and execute investment decisions.

Regulators and the financial press have criticized credit rating agencies (CRAs) for exacerbating the financial crisis by providing overly optimistic debt ratings. Allegedly, CRAs departed from their quantitative models in order to please security issuers with higher credit ratings. In response, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 required the Securities and Exchange Commission to conduct a study on alternative models for compensating CRAs. We conduct an experiment exploring how the credit ratings of M.B.A. students, who assume the role of credit rating analysts, are affected by two proposals for reform: (1) changing who pays the CRAs, and (2) requiring analysts to justify departures from a quantitative model. We find that credit ratings are highest when the borrower pays CRAs for ratings and a justification requirement is not in place. Implementing either proposed reform independently reduces credit ratings, but credit ratings are not further reduced when both reforms are implemented together. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.