We investigate how price discovery occurs in the options markets through traders' trade size choice. By employing transactions data on all options traded on a sample of 100 firms, we show that informed traders fragment their orders into small (medium) trades for low (high) volume contracts. We also find that almost 60% of the price discovery occurs in the exchange with the largest market share for a given option, where informed traders favor medium size trades. Upon examining distinct option series for a given stock, we find that at-the-money calls display the highest information share.

Using audit-trail data from the Toronto Stock Exchange, we find that market makers scale back in unison when market conditions are unfavorable, which contributes to covariation in liquidity supply, both within and across stocks. Market conditions lower aggregate participation via their impact on trading profits and risk. Contrary to regulatory view, higher stock volatility is associated with more participation and higher profits, even after controlling for other market conditions, including stock volume. Fragility concerns extend to larger stocks and to active participants. The designated market maker mitigates periodic illiquidity created by synchronous withdrawal of market makers in large and small stocks.

[Using a proprietary dataset of institutional investors' equity transactions, we document that institutional trading desks can sustain relative performance over adjacent periods.We find that trading-desk skill is positively correlated with the performance of the institution's traded portfolio, suggesting that institutions that invest resources in developing execution abilities also invest in generating superior investment ideas. Although some brokers can deliver better executions consistently over time, our analysis suggests that trading-desk skill is not limited to a selection of better brokers. We conclude that the trade implementation process is economically important and can contribute to relative portfolio performance.]

We explore the link between mutual funds and fragility risk in the corporate bond market. We classify a fund’s trading style based on its responses to signals of large dealer inventories. Trading style is persistent and the majority of funds demand liquidity. Notably, a subset of funds earn positive alpha by intentionally supplying liquidity during periods of sustained customer selling (with transitory price effects). Liquidity-supplying funds maintain their relative trading style when facing large outflows and elevated market stress, thus alleviating fragility risk. Our results add nuance to existing evidence that mutual funds pose a threat to market stability.

A significant but unresolved question in the current debate about the role of intermediaries in financial markets is whether intermediaries behave as passive traders or whether they actively seek and trade on information. We address this issue by explicitly comparing the informational advantages of intermediaries with those of other investors in the market. We find that intermediaries account for greater price discovery than other institutional and individual investors in spite of initiating fewer trades and volume. Furthermore, intermediary information does not arise from inappropriate handling of customer orders by intermediaries. We propose that our findings are consistent with noisy rational expectations models, where agents extract valuable information from past prices. Intermediaries bear little or no opportunity cost of monitoring market conditions, which gives them an advantage in making profitable price-contingent trades. Lower trading costs may also enable intermediaries to trade more effectively and frequently on their information.

Many financial markets, including electronic limit order markets, assign designated liquidity providers (LPs). We study the experience of the Stockholm Stock Exchange, where listed firms contract directly with LPs. Our analysis offers insights regarding situations where designated liquidity provision may be beneficial. In addition, we consider the form of liquidity provision contracts, including affirmative obligations required of the LP and compensation for LP services. We find that low current trading activity, wide spreads, and higher information asymmetry increase the attractiveness of contracted liquidity provision. The evidence indicates that LPs trade against market movements and in times of wide spreads. On balance, firms contracting with LPs experience a decreased cost of capital and significant improvements in market quality and price discovery.