This study analyzes the evolution of climate-risk discourse in banking using 4,887 news articles (2008–2024) collected from ProQuest. We apply Natural Language Processing and add two novel layers: (i) an event-alignment analysis that links coverage dynamics to dated policy and supervisory milestones, and (ii) a discourse-network analysis connecting banks and regulators. We document a marked post-2020 shift, with ESG emerging as the dominant framing (7,860 mentions) alongside persistent geographic asymmetries (U.S.-led coverage) and uneven sectoral engagement (Risk Management highest salience; Fintech lowest). Sentiment skews positive (≈4,000 positive vs. ≈1,500 negative), and topic modeling identifies eight stable thematic clusters spanning operations, ratings, ESG assessment, disclosures, and market instruments. Event alignment shows media attention is typically anticipatory (median peak two months before an anchor), with COP26 producing a sustained level shift (+100% within a ±6-month window) and the Bank of England’s CBES results generating the largest single spike (210 articles), whereas some 2022 rule-making announcements (e.g., SEC climate-disclosure proposal) exhibit sharper but less durable attention. The discourse network centers on two regulatory hubs (the Federal Reserve and the ECB) with key banks (e.g., Citigroup, JPMorgan, UBS) bridging into supervisory narratives. Collectively, the findings show climate risk becoming embedded in core banking practice while revealing structural, regional, and functional asymmetries that matter for policy design and implementation. • Provides the first longitudinal NLP-based analysis of climate risk discourse in the banking sector • Reveals how climate risk integration in banking has evolved across regulatory, operational, and market dimensions • Identifies distinct thematic domains shaping climate risk narratives in banking over time • Shows that climate risk discourse is predominantly anticipatory around major policy and supervisory milestones • Maps the institutional structure of climate risk governance by linking banks and regulators within a discourse network

We empirically investigate the impact of shareholders’ excess control rights (greater control than cash-flow rights) on bank profitability and risk and how the global financial crisis of 2007–2008 might have modified such an impact for a sample of European commercial banks. While the presence of excess control rights is associated with lower profitability, higher earnings volatility and higher default risk before the crisis (2002–2006) but also at the later stage of the financial crisis (2009–2010), conversely, it improves profitability, lowers earnings volatility and no longer affects default risk during the 2007–2008 financial crisis years. Further evidence shows that, regardless of the period, the effect of excess control rights on profitability and risk is accentuated in family-controlled banks and in countries with relatively weak shareholder protection rights and that such an effect is mainly effective at intermediate and high levels of excess control rights. Overall, our findings contribute to the literature examining the corporate governance determinants of banks’ performance during the 2007–2008 global financial crisis and have several policy implications.

We discuss the implications on banks and the economy of prudential regulatory intervention to soften the treatment of non-performing exposures (NPEs) and ease bank capital buffers. We apply these easing measures on a sample of Globally Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) and show that these banks can play a constructive role in sustaining economic growth during the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, an empirical analysis shows that prudential regulatory responses to COVID-19 along with high regulatory capital and low non-performing loans ratios are positively associated with economic growth. Thus, banks should maintain high capital ratios in the medium-term horizon to absorb future losses, as the effect of COVID-19 on the economy might take time to fully materialize.

The theory of financial intermediation highlights various channels through which capital and liquidity are interrelated. Using a simultaneous equations framework, we investigate the relationship between bank regulatory capital and bank liquidity measured from on-balance sheet positions for European and US publicly traded commercial banks. Previous research studying the determinants of bank capital buffer has neglected the role of liquidity. On the whole, we find that banks decrease their regulatory capital ratios when they face higher illiquidity as defined in the Basel III accords or when they create more liquidity as measured by Berger and Bouwman (2009). However, considering other measures of illiquidity that focus more closely on core deposits in the United States, our results show that small banks strengthen their solvency standards when they are exposed to higher illiquidity. Our empirical investigation supports the need to implement minimum liquidity ratios concomitant to capital ratios, as stressed by the Basel Committee; however, our findings also shed light on the need to further clarify how to define and measure illiquidity and also on how to regulate large banking institutions, which behave differently than smaller ones.

This paper explores how banks’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) activities affect their lending during financial crises. We use a sample of European listed banks with available ESG scores from 2002 to 2020 and consider the global financial crisis of 2007–2009 and the European sovereign debt crisis of 2010–2012. We estimate a two-step system GMM dynamic panel data model and also address potential endogeneity with instrumental variable (IV) and difference-in-difference (DiD) estimations. We find that lending falls to a lesser extent for banks with higher ESG scores during crisis times. Our findings are robust to using alternative ESG rating providers. An investigation of the different potential channels shows that, during crises, banks more engaged in ESG activities are less affected in terms of credit risk, asset risk, and profitability. They also face a lower reduction in market funding, allowing them to downsize to a lesser extent during crises, and their deposit rates do not increase as much as in less ESG-engaged banks. A deeper investigation reveals that our findings mainly hold for banks focused on traditional lending and deposit activities and are essentially driven by the environmental pillar component of ESG scores and the global financial crisis of 2007–2009.

We examine how individualism affects bank capital decisions worldwide and in the United States at the state level. Based on a sample of 7034 banks in 68 countries, we establish three major findings. First, individualism is negatively and significantly associated with bank regulatory capital, and the association is independent of the influence of formal institutional environments. Second, effective legal enforcement magnifies individualism's negative effect on bank regulatory capital. Finally, focusing on the United States, we also find that banks in individualistic states hold less regulatory capital than banks in collectivist states do. Effective state-level legal enforcement magnifies the effect of individualism. Our findings suggest that individualism constrains regulators, as regulatory guidelines or formal institutional factors operate very differently depending on the informal institutional environment.

Using a sample of banks operating in 24 countries, we provide robust evidence that stronger creditor rights are associated with higher capital adequacy ratios for conventional banks but not for Islamic banks. Such results suggest that, under stronger creditor protection, only the managers of conventional banks increase equity, presumably as a means of signalling better monitoring efforts and of avoiding loss of control. A possible reason for the finding that Islamic banks do not generally increase equity is that, under the profit loss sharing (PLS) principle, depositors share profits and losses with the bank. The role of creditor protection is hence irrelevant in an Islamic banking context. However, we show that in predominantly non-Muslim countries with less competitive markets, Islamic banks show a similar association between creditor rights and capital ratios as conventional banks.

We study the liquidity behavior of commercial banks in response to negative capital shocks. Using pre-Basel III data, U.S. banks with assets less than $1 billion treated (unregulated) liquidity and (regulated) capital as substitutes. Following exogenous shocks to their regulatory capital ratios, these banks shifted away from loans, loan commitments, and dividend payouts, actions that both repaired their capital ratios and enhanced their liquidity positions. We find little similar behavior at larger banks. We conclude that a minimum capital constraint naturally mitigates liquidity risk at community banks, justifying the exemption of these banks from the Basel III liquidity standards.

This paper investigates the impact of banks’ political connections on their ability to collect deposits under two different deposit insurance regimes (blanket guarantee and limited guarantee). We use a unique hand-collected dataset that identifies the political connections of Indonesian commercial banks, from Q1:2002 to Q2:2008. We find that, regardless of their type (state-owned or private entities), politically connected banks are able to attract deposits more easily than their non-connected counterparts. We also show that this effect is more pronounced after the implementation of formal deposit insurance with limited coverage. Our findings have various policy implications. Formal deposit insurance might have improved market discipline, as highlighted by earlier studies, but it has also exacerbated the issue of political connections in the banking sector.