We study how a firm's accounting accruals affect the heterogeneity of investor beliefs on the firm's value and further affect the firm's future stock returns. We document three findings. First, we find that the level of the heterogeneity in investor beliefs on a firm's value is higher when the firm experiences a larger increase in its accounting accruals. Second, we find that future stock returns following the earnings announcement are lower when the firm's accounting accruals increases the heterogeneity of investor beliefs to a larger degree. Finally, we also find that the effect of the accruals-induced heterogeneous investor beliefs on future stock returns is more pronounced when short-sale constraints are more binding. Overall, our empirical findings suggest that accounting accruals are a key determinant of the heterogeneity of investor beliefs. They also suggest a channel of investor beliefs whereby accruals affect future stock returns by affecting the heterogeneity of investor beliefs.

Traditional finance theories typically treat leases and debt as substitutes. However, the empirical findings on the relation between leases and debt are mixed. This paper reinvestigates this relation. I present a model to incorporate different theories on the substitutability and complementarity between leases and debt, and I test the model implications empirically in a GMM framework that simultaneously controls for endogeneity problems and firms' fixed effects. The findings suggest that leases and debt are substitutes instead of complements. I also investigate the variation in the substitutability between leases and debt, and find that in those firms with more growth options or larger marginal tax rates, or in those firms paying no dividends, the substitutability is more pronounced, i.e., the cost of new debt increases to a larger degree with extra leases.

[We test several hypotheses on how takeover premium is related to investors' divergence of opinion on a target's equity value. We show that the total takeover premium, the preannouncement target stock price run-up, and the post-announcement stock price markup are all higher when investors have higher divergence of opinion. We obtain identical results with higher market-level investor sentiment. When divergence of opinion is higher, a firm is less likely to be a takeover target, although takeover synergy in successful takeovers is higher. Our results suggest that takeovers may play a role in explaining high contemporaneous stock prices in the presence of high divergence of investor opinion.]

We study the long-run effects of product market advertising on the equity of firms conducting initial public offerings (IPOs). We find that firms going public with a greater extent of advertising prior to their IPOs are valued higher both in the IPO as well as in the immediate aftermarket, are associated with greater upward price revisions from the pre-IPO filing range means, and have smaller long-run post-IPO stock returns. The above results hold even after controlling for the effects of investor attention, as proxied by the pre-IPO media coverage received by firms going public. We show, using a number of additional tests, that the above findings are consistent with the implications of the heterogeneous beliefs theories of Miller (1977), Harrison and Kreps (1978), and Morris (1996), along with an assumption that product market advertising increases the heterogeneity in outside investor beliefs about firms going public.

This paper provides the first theoretical explanation and the first empirical analysis of contingent value rights (CVRs), which have been used as a means of payment in acquisitions, exchange offers, debt restructurings, Chapter 11 reorganizations, and lawsuit settlements. A CVR is a put option committing to pay additional cash or securities to CVR holders, contingent on the issuer's share price falling below a prespecified reference level. In this paper, we develop a model to show that CVRs can help a higher-intrinsic-value firm to reveal its firm type when the firm faces an asymmetric information problem. Our model predicts that i) when CVRs are offered along with cash or stock, the announcement period abnormal stock return is greater than that in stock offers, ii) firms facing more severe asymmetric information problems are more likely to offer CVRs to signal their firm type, and iii) firms that are relatively more cash-constrained are more likely to offer CVRs rather than cash. We test all three predictions using a sample of mergers and acquisitions. Our empirical results are consistent with the predictions of the model.

We analyze the interaction between a firm's product market advertising and its corporate financing decisions. We consider a firm that faces asymmetric information in both the product and financial markets and that needs to raise external financing to fund its growth opportunity (new project). Any product market advertising undertaken by the firm is visible to the financial market as well. In equilibrium, the firm uses a combination of product market advertising, equity underpricing, and underfinancing (raising a smaller amount of external capital than the full information optimum) to convey its true product quality and the intrinsic value of its projects to consumers and investors. The following two predictions arise from our theoretical analysis for the relation between product market advertising and equity underpricing around new equity issues. First, firms choose a higher level of product market advertising when they are planning to issue new equity, compared with situations in which they have no immediate plans to do so. Second, product market advertising and equity underpricing are substitutes for a firm issuing new equity. We empirically test the above two predictions and find supporting evidence in the context of firms making initial public offerings and seasoned equity offerings.

We test several hypotheses on how takeover premium is related to investors' divergence of opinion on a target's equity value. We show that the total takeover premium, the pre-announcement target stock price run-up, and the post-announcement stock price markup are all higher when investors have higher divergence of opinion. We obtain identical results with higher market-level investor sentiment. When divergence of opinion is higher, a firm is less likely to be a takeover target, although takeover synergy in successful takeovers is higher. Our results suggest that takeovers may play a role in explaining high contemporaneous stock prices in the presence of high divergence of investor opinion.

We hypothesize that active mutual funds can promote corporate social responsibility (CSR) in their portfolio firms through stock trading activities. Leveraging mutual fund family mergers to identify causal effects, we find that a firm’s CSR commitment increases when its mutual funds exhibit stronger CSR preferences through trading. This effect is stronger when mutual fund investors are more active or when the firm’s stock exhibits higher liquidity. Additionally, our results suggest that the trading channel complements non-trading mechanisms through which active mutual funds influence firm CSR.

Using China’s religion and household survey data, we find that a high degree of religiosity increases households’ willingness to borrow, both formally from financial institutions and informally from family and friends. A high degree of religiosity could facilitate formal household borrowing by fostering trust in transactions. However, the trust mechanism cannot explain the impact of religiosity on informal borrowing. We hypothesize that a strong religiosity might facilitate informal loans by promoting altruism, and we find supporting evidence. The effect of religiosity on informal loans is more pronounced in transactions where the parties involved are intrinsically less altruistic toward each other.